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UNITED STATES

(&

1.

t::P'
Federal/ Criminal

SUMMARY:

~~ ~-__, . .-:.

Q~+

v.
ORTIZ

'

I

L

--~).

--

~ ~ve, ~ <
Timely

Resp was convicted of three counts of transporting aliens who

were illegally present in this country, 8 USC §1324(a)(2), and was sentenced to six
months incarceration followed by three years probation.

He had been stopped at a

out
fixed checkpoint and his vehicle had been searched with/probable cause.
~

aliens were found.
\__.,

Three illegal

CA 9 reversed on authority of United States v. Bowen,

cert pending No. 73-6848, Summer List 14/2.

F. 2d __,

There by a vote of 7-6 CA 9 ruled en

bane that Almeida -Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, which held that roving

...
'

border patrol searches for illegal aliens may not be c t
applied also to fixed checkpoint searches.

ducte

witho J t probab e cause,

The panel ~ ere, also on author· y of Bowen,

ruled that since the search in this case occurred after
___., Almeida-Sanchez was decided,

-

although before Bowen was decided, the evidence must be suppressed.

Without the

aliens as evidence the government had no case, therefore CA 9 ordered the indictme11:t
dismissed.
~

The SG seeks cert claiming that Bowen and similar CA 5 and CA 10 decisions have
incorrectly extended Almeida-Sanchez and have unduly hampered the administration of
the alien entrance laws.

The SG contends first, that probable cause in the traditional
~

sense is not required for fixed checkpoint searches and that there need be no prior
judicial acquiescence to fixed checkpoint searches.

Second, if he is wrong on his first

claim the SG claims CA 9 erred when it held Bowen applicable to all searches after

(

-

Almeida-Sanchez.

Since Bowen extended
____.. Almeida-Sanchez it should have been prospec -

tive from its own date, not Almeida-Sanchez.
2.

FACTS:

The San Clemente checkpoint is a permanent fixed Border Patrol

facility located about 66 miles north of the border between Mexico and the United States.
It is on a major highway between Los Angeles and San Diego.

Pendleton and on the west is the Pacific ocean.

On the east is Camp

These barriers, combined with other

fixed checkpoints, create an obstacle to aliens attempting to move north illegally.
San Clemente checkpoint is the "cornerstone" of the network.
s

The

During a normal eight

2 -30 aliens will be apprehended although only 3o/o of the vehicles
A U.S. agent, in uniform stands next to the highway and

signals cars to slow down.
"break the pattern.
under rear seat.

11

Then he sight checks the cars and beckons those over whic h

·- -------

These cars are searched wherever aliens might hide,

~·,

trunk,

The primary purpose of the checkpoint is not apprehension of illegal aliens, it
is deterrence.

/

It is simple for aliens to walk across the b~rder itself.

north where the jobs await they must be transported by a smuggler.
glers have a decent chance of getting through the checkpoints.
charge about $250 a head.

..

But to get

\.

...

Only th e smug-

And the smug glers

Thus the size of the fee is dependent upon the existence of

the checkpoints and is a deterrent to a Mexican would be border violator.
Resp is a smuggler.

On November 12, 1973, he was stopped at the San Clemente

~~~

checkpoint and three aliens were found concealed in the trunk of his car.
dieted for transporting illegal aliens.

He was in-

Before trial he moved to suppress. Since there

were several such motions pending in the Southern District of California at the time,

_

they were consolidated before Judge Turrentine for a hearing on whether the fixed
~JL. · ~ checkpoints violated Almeida -Sanchez.

Judge Turrentine,
in a thorough opinion, held
____.

that the fixed checkpoints in the District, whether temporary or permanent, were the
"functional equivalent" of the border and therefore passed muster under AlmeidaSanchez.

Resp was then tried and convicted. ·

On appeal CA 9 rever sed on the basis of Bowen, a 7-6 CA 9 decision which defined
"functional equivalent" of a border search to be
a location where virtually everyone searched has just
come from the other side of the border, • • • [or if it
can be said with]. reasonable certainty that the vehicle
searched contained either goods which had just been
smuggled or a person who had just crossed the border
illegally.
Clearly the San Clemente checkpoint, and the facts of the stop here .do not fulfill that
definition.
Although Bowen was decided in May 1974, and the search herein was conducted in
( '-r

November 1973, the panel here held Bowen applicable because the Almeida-Sanchez
decision was rendered in June 1973.

Bowen itself had applied this limited retroactiv ity .

3.

CONTENTIONS:

(a)

The SG does no contend that the San Clemente check oint

is the "functional equivalent" of the border.

(

tion.

He agrees in general with the CA 9 defini-

However, citing Mr. Justice Powell 1 s concurrence in Almeida -Sanchez the SG
~

argues that the reasonableness of a search of an automobile for aliens does not neces'

sarily depend upon the existence of probable cause to believe an alien will be found in

. !(

a certain automobile.

Rather, a search may be reasonable if co:t?-ducted as part of an

areawide pro ram of searches which is itself reasonable measured by the existence of
a legitimate law enforcement need balanced against the extent of the intrusion.

The SG

submits that this constitutes a "constitutionally adequate equivalent of probable cause."
413 U.S. at 279 (Mr. Justice Powell, concurring),
Mr. Justice Powell concluded in Almeida-Sanchez that a prior judicial determination of the reasonableness was necessary for particular roving border searches.

But

for fixed checkpoint searches, the SG contends, prior judicial approval "would add
little to the reasonableness of the, •• operations, and •• "' a subsequent judicial determination on a motion to suppress adequately protects Fourth Amendment values.

11

Unlike roving patrols in lonely areas fixed checkpoint operations are highly visible
because they are conducted on major thoroughfares.

The vehicle inspection procedure

is regularized and of course only those vehicles which approach the checkpoint are
inspected.

These factors decrease the opportunity for arbitrary conduct, and the need

for periodic ex parte judicial supervision,

In any case where a checkpoint does not

operate fairly an individual may make a motion to suppress.
Perhaps to flesh out the factual basis for his argument the SG states in a footnote
)l

\\

that the government has applied for and has been refused warrants to search for aliens
at checkpoints in the Southern District of California,

N. 6.

Magistrates have been

willing to is sue warrants permitting vehicle stops only for interrogation.

The SG sur-

mises that the magistrates do not believe the Fourth Amendment allows issuance of

general searc.Q. warrants on a checkpo1nt bas1s.

C!. 4! 3

u.s.

at

t.IU,

n•

.5.

Resp replies that the three CAs which have ruled on warrantless searches conducted without probable cause at checkpoints not the functional equivalent of the bord e r
agree that Almeida-Sanchez invalidates such searches. · United States v. Speed, 497
F. 2d ?46 ( CA 5, 1974); United States v. King, 485 F. 2d 353 ( CA 10, 1974); United
States v. Maddox, 485 F. 2d 361 (CA 10, 1974).

Since the government here concedes

that the search was not conducted at the functional equivalent of the border and was not
supported by probable cause, the search fails under Almeida-Sanchez.

Moreover, the r e

is no functional difference between fixed and roving stops for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment.

In both cases the opportunity for arbitrary conduct on the part of the

officers is the same, and the lack of a prior judicial ruling on a specific search is
present.
(b) Second, the SG contends that even if his first argument is not accepted CA 9
erred in applying the Bowen decision retroactively to the date of the Almeida -Sanchez
decision.

Bowen should apply only prospectively because it presents a "clear break

with the past.

11

Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 248.

Prior to Bowen, the SG

claims, fixed checkpoint searches had been repeatedly and consistently upheld in CA 9.
And the issue was specifically left open in Almeida-Sanchez.

Moreover, the purposes

behind the exclusionary rule are in no way advanced by imposing the sanction of suppression against police activities conducted in good faith which were acceptable under
statute and judicial decision at the time they occurred.

Therefore under both retro-

activity principles and exclusionary rule principles Bowen should be applied pro spectively.
Resp argues that Almeida-Sanchez is far from a new constitutional rule.

That

case merely applied Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 to procedures which
obviously violated its principles, and Bowen simply did the same thing to the fixed

'.'

checkpoint situation.

Therefore retroactiVIty a:t lea--s-r to .A:Imeiaa -ua-ncnez :us

4, DISCUSSION:
Border Patrol.

JU:;;~n.~:ea..

(a) In 1963, 39, 000 aliens were apprehended in the U.S. by the
-~

By 1973, the figure had jumped to 498, 000 aliens.

And for a variety

...----

of reasons the increase should continue.

See Appendix C of Petn.

The SG contends

that CAs have extended Almeida -Sanchez by applying it to fixed checkpoints and that
the extension has severely hampered Border Patrol efforts to curb this influx of
illegal aliens.

The contention that Almeida -Sanchez has been extended seems correct

because five members of the Court indicated that the fixed checkpoint issue was not in
that case.

-

-

LFP, 413 U.S. at 276; CJ, BRW, HAB, WHR, 413 U.S. ·at 288.

The con-

tention that the extension has severely hampered law enforcement is bolstered by a
DC findi.n:g that there is no "reasonable or effective alternative" to fixed checkpoints
:Z:< 4~ ,
to stop illegal aliens from entering from Mexico.

App. at 20A.

Moreover, the govern-

m ·e nt is in a real bind because magistrates apparently refuse to issue general warrants
which would allow effective alien searches at checkpoints.

Thus the SG' s contention

that the matter requires this Court's attention seems to have merit.
The SG, however, does not assert a strong conflict on the issue of whether
Almeida-Sanchez applies to fixed checkpoint searches.

The CAs have been uniform

in agreeing that it does with the exception of one panel of CA 5 which, in a petition for
rehearing, stated that it made a difference that the defendant was stopped by a fixed
checkpoint.

United States v. DeLeon, No. S72-1052, Decided November 1, 1973.

But

in that case it is possible that the panel assumed the checkpoint to be the functional
equivalent of the border since it was only ten

mi~es

away.

There are other cases pending here dealing with Almeida -Sanchez problems, see
the helpful compendium in the preliminary memo for Hendrix v. United States, No. 7 3 1896, SL 15/2.

However, the is sue of whether Almeida -Sanchez applies to fixed chec k-

point searches is presented well here.

,.._,,I

The San Clemente checkpoint is the "corner-

.. . '

(

- 7 stone" checkpoint in the SD Cal. App. at 25A.

It is permanent, and unless traffic

or weather prohibit, it operates continuously.

And it cannot be considered the

"functional equivalent" of the border.

Moreover, the Bowen opinion is incorporated

into this case since the reversal here is based solely on that decision.
(b)

There are several petitions here dealing with various retroactivity problems

arising from Almeida-Sanchez, most notably United States v. Peltier, No. 73-2000, SL
13/3, where CA 9 holds that Almeida-Sanchez applies to roving patrol cases pending on
the date of decision.

Of course the retroactivity issue in the instant case is dependent

upon whether fixed checkpoints are somehow acceptable or not.

It would seem, howeve r ,

that whatever principles are decided upon to settle the conflict between Peltier and
Miller v. United States, (CA 5), No. 73-6975, (not listed as of 9/10/74) 1would also
settle the issue here.
There is a response.
(

9/10/74

Kelly

CA memo in Appx.
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List 3, Sheet 2
No. 73-2050

Motion of Re sp for
Appointment of Counsel

UNITED STATES

v.

Motion of SG to Dispense
with Printing Appendix

ORTIZ
A./ On October 15 1 the Court granted cert to CA 9 in this case to consider a que stion involving roving border patrol searches.

The Court also granted resp 1 s motion

to proceed IFF.
Resp now moves for the appointment of John J. Cleary of the Federal Defenders
of San Diego, Inc. to represent him before the Court.

The Federal Defenders' orga-

nization was appointed to represent resp in the USDC and CA.

The organization is not

funded by grant, but depends exclusively on payments under the Criminal Justice Act.
Mr. Cleary is a member of the Bar of this Court.

..
- 2 -

""":

'

.

It has been the Court 1 s practice in similar cases to appoint Mr. Cleary, rather
than the organization, as counsel to represent resp.
B./

Pursuant to Rule 36(8), the SG moves to dispense with the requirement of

an appendix.

He states that the parties agree that the only items that need be printed

are those reproduced in the appendix to the cert petition and that resp has agreed to
the motion.
There are no responses.
11/14/74
PJN

Ginty

re:

United States v. Ortiz
No. 73-2050
United States v. Brigononi-Ponce
No. 74-114

AUTOMOBILE LICENSE CHECKS AND
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

By
CHARLES

.I

c.

AMES

Reprint from Volume 60, No. 4
VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
01974

January 24.7 1975 Conference
List 3, Sheet 2
No. 73-2050

Motion for Appointment of
New Counsel

On November 18, 19741 the Court appointed John J. Cleary, Executive Director
of Federal Defenders of San Diego, to represent resp for the purpose of oral argument
i n this Court.

The appointment was made in response to a motion submitted by the

c ommunity defender organization requesting that the organization be appointed to
a ppear on behalf of resp and in keeping with the Court 1 s practice of appointing a named
a ttorney as opposed to a designated legal aid group to represent an indigent party befor e
t he Court.
Mr. Cleary now requests that the Court substitute Charles M. Sevoilla, Chief
Tr i al Attorney of Federal Defenders for himself as appointed counsel for resp.
)

It

- 2 appears that Mr. Sevilla., who is a member of the bar of this Court, is the principal

+c

author of resp 1 s brief and the attorney designated by his organizatio~argue orally
re sp 1 s cause.
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BENCH MEMORANDUM
TO:

Justice Powell

FROM:

David Boyd

DATE:

February 11, 1975

Border Search Cases
These four cases present a number of issues which
generally can be categorized as either Fourth Amendment questions
or questions of retroactivity.

The general categories of

questions are related, however, and the nature and number of
retroactivity issues that the Court will have to decide
will depend on the resolution of the Fourth Amendment questions.
I consider all of the retroactivity issues to be relatively
simple matters.

As you are well aware, the Fourth Amendment

issues are far from easy and your vote will probably determine
their outcome.
This memorandum is broken into parts.

Part I simply

outlines the questions and the factual variations presented
by each of the four cases.

In view of the similarity of some

of the issues and fact patterns, I thought this simple
scorecard might help us both keep the cases straight.
briefly discusses the retroactivity issues.

Part II

While it is perhaps

somewhat illogical to discuss these issues in advance of
the resolution of the Fourth Amendment questions, I have

2.

proceeded in this manner largely because I can offer a more
definitive opinion on the retroactivity questions.

On the

Fourth Amendment issues, I can offer only thoughts and
speculations at this time.

Hopefully we can formulate a more

concrete position in advance of conference.
!-Summary of the Cases Presented:
In view of the number of cases that present similar
but discrete issues in slightly dissimilar factual e ontexts,
it might be helpful by beginning with a brief review of the
facts of Almeida Sanchez and of the facts of each of the cases
under consideration and the questions they present.
Almeida Sanchez:
The search at issue was conducted pursuant to a
"roving patrol", which you essentially characterized as a
search made pursuant to a decision that was not "supported
by probable cause in the sense of specific knowledge about
a particular automobile."

413 U.S. at 281.

The search

occurred on an east-west highway located some 20 to 25 miles
north of the border.

All agreed that this could not be

considered the "funct ional equivalent" of the border and
that, if it could, the search would have been valid.

'

'·

3.

United States v. Peltier, No. 73-2000:
The sole question presented by this case is whether
the Court's decision in Almeida Sanchez is to be applied
retroactively.
Facts:

Officials conducting what the Solicitor

General concedes to have been a roving immigration patrol

.

~

during the early morning hours, spotted respondent's car
proceeding north at a point some 70 miles north of the border.
The agents knew that the road was frequently used by
smugglers of aliens, and were suspicious because respondent's
car was old and because respondent appeared to be of Mexican
descent.

The officials requested to examine the trunk,

and discovered marijuana.

The Solicitor General does

not assert in this case that traditional cause existed
for the stop.

That kind of claim is made in Brigoni-Ponce.

United States v. Brigoni-Ponce, No. 74-114:
The question presented in this case is whether agents
can conduct a warrantless stop of a vehicle in the "border
area" for the purpose of questioning its occupants about
their nationality and right to be in the United States.
Facts:

Petitioners were stopped on the open highway

some four miles south of San Clemente and 58 miles north
of the border.

The San Clemente fixed checkpoint was closed

4.

due to inclement weather, and this automobile was stopped
because the agents noticed that its occupants looked Mexican.
No search was required.

The questioning alone indicated

that some of the occupants were illegal aliens, and all were
arrested.
Bowen v. United States, No. 73-6848:
This case potentially presents two kinds of issues.
The first question is whether the Fourth Amendment authorizes
a search of an automobile for aliens, conducted at a fixed
immigration checkpoint without a warrant and without
particularized probable cause.
more thoroughly in Ortiz.
does not,

The Government argues this issue

If the Court determines that it

retroactivity questions are presented, the most

significant of which is whether this ruling should apply to
searches conducted before the Court's decision in Almeida.
Facts:

Petitioner was stopped at a fixed checkpoint

located 36 air miles and 49 road miles north of the Mexican
border.

Agents' testimony indicates that they noticed nothing

unusual about petitioner or his vehicle.

At the time, they

were stopping all vehicles except those occupied by persons they
knew.

After petitioner identified himself to be a United

States citizen, agents r equested to inspect the inside of
his "camper" attachment to his pickup truck.

When the camper

5.

was opened\, agents noticed the strong scent of marijuana.
Entry into the camper and minor additional inspection revealed
the marijuana in plain view.
United States v. Ortiz, No. 73-2050:
In this case the Government fully develops their
position that the Fourth Amendment tolerates warrantless
searches of automobiles without particularized probable
cause if conducted at fixed irmnigration checkpoints.

The

case also presents a potential issue of retroactivity:
whether the decision should apply to invalidate searches
conducted prior to the Ninth Circuit's!:.!!: bane decision in
Bowen o
Facts:

Respondent, a United States citizen of

Mexican descent, was stopped at the permanent checkpoint
at San Clemente, some 62 miles north of the border.

He

was directed to a side area and agents searched the trunk of
his car.

The search revealed three aliens o

II- Retroactivity Problems:
The most obvious

retroactivity question to consider

first is the question of the retroactivi+y of Almeida Sanchez
to

cases of a similar nature.

That is the only issue presentee

in Peltier.
The parties generally agree that the threshhold issue is
.1.

whether this Court's retroactivity decisions apply at all. That
.....
question turns on whether Almeida Sanchez "marks a sharp
break in the law" by "overrul[ing] clear past precedent ••.
or distupt[ing]
on."

a practice long accepted and widely relied

Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 381-382, n.2 (Stewart,

J., dissenting). The basic standard is reflected in Justice
White's recent opinion in Daniels v. Lousiana( which you joined)
and Justice Blackmun's opinion in Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 665,
672-672 (1973) . (which you also joined).

In making this

basic assessment, the inquiry must focus on the practical
"fact[s] of legallife,''Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S., at 199
(you joined), one mf which is the assumption that officials will
rely on legally enacted statu tes unti 1 they are abrogated by
the judiciary. Id.

Finally, the

Court's opinion in Chevron

Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, establishes that lower court
precedent can be considered in determining whether clear past
precedent existed.
I think that the Ninth Circuit's determination that the
Almeida secision neither overrules clear past precedent nor
disrupts long accepted practice flies in the face of your concurring opinion, 413 U.S., at 278, and Justice White's dissent.
d
L·,

at 289 , n. 10 o

Th e court of appeals' view also is inconsistent

with the rather pragmatic approach repreatedly e spoused by this
eourt, a pragmatism that would seem particularly appropriate
in this case. As you have recognized in Schnechcloth and your

opinion for the Court in Calandra, the exclusionary rule serves primaril
a prophylactic effect.

Prophylaxis can only operate in futuro.

I therefore think that your view on this issue is largely
dictated by your past opinions and should be that Almeida does
not require exclusion of evidence obtained in searches conducted
before that decision was announced.
The question of the a pplicability of an Almeida-type
llinitation on fixed checkpoint searches and on warrantless stops
for request of documentation of nationality is slightly more
complicated, requiring the additional

consideration , ~£

the

extent to which the Court's decision in Almeida should have
affected other kinds of border searches conducted after that
time. Again, in view of your careful indication that the plurality
opinion did not necessarily resolve those questions and Justice
White's dissenting opinion, the continuation of the fixed
checkpoint practice does not appear to be unreasonable.
_prophylactic
That, combined with the limite~value to be served by
applying the

exclusionary rule retroactively persuades me that

any decisions governing warrantless document stops and fixed
checkpoint searches should be prospective . Of course, the present
composition of the Court makes it quite likely that that issue
will not arise; the vote appears to be at least 4-3 to uphold
the fixed checkpoint practice.

II- The Fourth Amendment Issues

The Doctunent Stop and the

Fixed Checkpoint Search:
In the not so short space of an evening, my thinking on
the warrantless stop issue in Brignoni-Ponce

has evolved to

a posture that repr esents a more cautious view of the case if
not a rejection of my previous thoughts.

My thinking on the

fixed checkpoint issue remains substantially unchanged,however.
Since the two are in some sense related, I will begin by identifying my view of the relationship between these two cases and
Almeida.
Although Almeida is technically a stop and search case,
the analysis is focused on the search aspect.

Justice Stewart's

opinion refers at some points to the stop and search , see 413
U.S., at 267-269, but he indicates that the Government did not
assert the existence of any "reasonable suspicion" analogous
to that found in Terry and he makes no significant reference to
considerations that might justify a stop for

more limited

purposes than the search there involved. Likewise your opinion
centers on probable cause to conduct searches, and your discussion
of Terry treats only that aspect of the case. Id o, at 280.
Nonetheless, I believe that the considerations surrounding the
nature and circtunstances of the stop are important in distinguishing Almeida from the checkpoint searches o

I further think that

the issue presented in Brignoni-Ponce, the warrantless stop for
the limited purpose of inquiry into citizenship, must be
viewed in relation to the spectrtun of cases from Almeida to Ortiz.

I continue to think that the real distinguishing
characteristic between Almeida's roving

patrol searches

and those that occur at fixed checkpoints is to be found in
the circumstances that surround the initial stop and
confrontation with officialdom.

In each case the scope of

the resulting search is essentially the same. Moreover, it
seems difficult to exact a great deal of mileage from the
difference in discretion initially vested in the official
who determines whether the search is to be conducted.

In the

context of the roving patrol, the officer must make an initial
determination to pull a car over to conduct a search. At the
fixed checkpoint the official must make a similar initial
determination to refer an automobile over to the side for
a similar inspection.

While the decision in the latter case

may be somewhat mare informed, I doubt whether the two are
distinguishable in any practical sense. The degree of discretion
to sele .t certain automobiles for search is largely identical.
Thus the distinction between the roving patrol search and the
fixed checkpoint search ironically relates to the circumstances
surrounding the stop rather than the search. In the context of
the roving patrol, the stop generally is totally unexpected and
is announced only by a £lasing light (as counsel pointed out,
the same basic kind of equipment used by Carl Chessman) o At
the fixed checkpoint, by contrast, the stop is preceded by
location of
more visible and reliable signs of authority. The/station
generally is

announced by signs and lights, the stopping officer

is uniformed and visible from the initial moments, and the overall
atmosph ere

is conducive to producing a greater feeling of

security that the encounter that is to follow is entirely
1

official and leg i timate.
The importance of this distinction stems from the fact
that the nature and degree of probable cause that might
exist to support a warrant to conduct fixed checkpoint searches
will be different and, more significantly, less powerful from
the "functional equivalent of probable cause" you identified
in Almeida. You described same of the considerations that
would contribute to a finding of area probable cau se
to include·: tthe· following:
[T]he frequency with which aliens illegally in the
country are known or reasonably believed to be
transported

w~ thin

a particular area;(ii) the

proximity of the area in question to the border;
(iii) the extensiveness and geographic characteristics of the area, including the roads therein
and the extent of their use, and (iv) the probable
degree of interference with the rights of innocent
persons, taking into account the scope of the
proposed search, its

duration, and the concentration

of illegal alien traffic in relation to the general
traffic of the road or area. 413 U.S., at 284.
It seems to me that one probably could not uphold a warrant to
conduct a roving pat rol in the San Clemente vicinity, and I
suspect that other fixed checkpoints would be equally difficult

1. The same characteristics tend to distinguish the temporary
checkpoint from the roving patrol and equate temporary checkpoints
more more to f i xed checkpoints than to roving patrols o The opinion
of the district court in Baca indicates that these general conditions
obtain at temporary checkpoints as well as fixed checkpoints. Thus, the
decision in Ortiz may largely decide the temporary checkpoint issue.
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to uphold under this standard.

Instead, the considerations

that would support a decision to issue a warrant for operation
of a fixed checkpoint would be somewhat different than thooe
supporting a warrant to conduct roving patrol searches and, in
my view, somewhat less demanding.

And if that is true, the

primary justification for imposing a less stringent functional
equivalent of probable cause would relate to the less
intrusive or less threatening nature of the preliminary
encounter, the stop.
If this factor is emphasized or even latent in the
Ortiz opinion, it becomes difficult to envision how Ortiz and
a broad stop permission in Brignoni would stand side by side.
On the one hand, Ortiz would say, in effect, the

less

threatening nature of the stop attendant to the fixed checkpoint search permits courts to demand somewhat less to satisfy
the functional equivalent of probable cause than is required in
Almaeida. On the other, Brignoni could only point to the absence
of the search in justifying the considerably greater leeway
accorded officials in stopping for document checks or inquiries
of nationality. Tn Ortiz, then, the different nature of the stop
woJ ld perhaps play a critical role in distinguishing Almeida.
But in Brignoni the same stop would be allowed on the basis of
considerably less justification than you required in Almeida
on the basis that the absence of the search somehow makes this
encounter much more reasonable in Fourth Amendment terms.
Thus, the grander scheme of opinions appears to suggest
an added difficulty in attempting to minimize the Fourth
Amendment problems attendant to the stop in Brignoni. I have a
hard time visualizing how the two opinions will stand togeuher

u.
unless we adopt a more cautious approach in Brignoni

than

simply stating that apparent alienage alone suffices to
support a stop for inquiry into nationality.
Apart from my visualization of the manner in which Almeida,
Ortiz, and Brignoni relate, I see other impediments to
resting the officiers' ability to stop on racial characteristics
alone. To these con siderations I now turn.

IIa-Brignoni and the Stop eases Compared:
Not

only ~ does

a determination that racial characteristics

alone suffice to support a stop for the limited purpose of
inquiring into

nationalit~ecome

difficult to square with what

you might have to say in Ortiz, it represents an extension of
the cause requirement of the Terry line of cases to

~ustify

a stop that is somewhat more intrusive than the stops considered
by this Court previously.
As an initial matter, it is clear that the stop .
implicates Fourth Amendment concerns.

In relative terms,

the stop of an automobile on the highway

is more of an

infringement of liberty than the stops considered in previous
cases in this Court. And Justice White's questions from the
bench identified another distinction that suggests that the
Brignoni stop

raises more difficult Fourth Amendment questions

than the Terry stops previously considered.

The Government

concedes that the rationale justifying the stop in Brignoni
necessarily imports a greater degree of authority than the
classic Terry stop.

In Terry, Justice White expressed the opinion

that although a policeman could always approach a citizen to make
inquiries, the citizen was equally free to refuse t9 answer, and

that refusal alone would not provide' probable cause for
arrest. 392 U.S., at 34 (White, J., concurring). The Government in this case admits, however, that the rationale for the
Brignoni stop

indicates that the officials have the power

to hold persons who are equally uncooperative. The Brignoni
stop thus implicates a somewhat greater theoretical power than
the Terry stop.
These two considerations initially would lead one to
conclude that the justification for a stop of the kind at issue
in Brignoni should be at least as strong as that
required to support a Terry stop.

Examination of that line

of cases, however, suggests that a stop based solely on the
fact that the automobile's

~PLM. MQ..ittw-

occupant~would

be an extension of

the probable cause concept of the Terry l i me of cases.

The

Court in Terry its elf described in some detai l the pattern of
suspicious activity observed by the officer prior to
his decision to approach the individuals and inquire of their
business. In general terms, the activities observed over a
period of some twenty minutes clearly suggested that they might
be "casing" a store for a robbery.

In Peters, the circumstances

were equally suggestive of the fact that the individuals had
just attempted to burgle an apartment. 392 U.S., at 48-50. And
in Adams, cause for suspicion was provided by information of
an informant that was partially corraborated by the observations
of the officer on the scene. 407 U.S., at 146-147.
A comparison of Sioron; a ' companion case to Terry, perhaps
makes the point most clearly.

In that case an officer witnessed

Sibron talking to a number of known narcotics users over a
period of eight hours. The officer had no precise know1Dge
of Sibron apart from that obtained through this period of
observation, and he did not know of the contents of the
conversations he had observed. The officer nonetheless approaced
Sibron in a restaurant, took him outside, and subsequently
searched him.

Although Chief Justice Warren indicated that

the case did not require a decision whether Sibron was "seized"
in the restraunt prior to his and the officer's departure
(the record was unc l ear on the question whether Sibron left the
restraunt with the officer on a voluntary basis or whether he
was required to leave by the officer) the opinion suggests that
the facts known to the officer were insufficient to support
a "seizure," and I question whether they would have supported
the kind of stop presented in Brignoni.
"An inference that persons who talk to narcotics
addicts are engaged in the criminal traffic
is simply not the sort of reasonable inference required
to support an intrusion by the police upon an individual's
personal security.

Nothing resembling probable

cause existed until after the search •••• "

392 U.S.,

at 62-63 0
It thus appears that the stop involved in the Brignoni
kinds of cases is more intrusive than the stops presented in
the Terry line of cases and that apparent alienage alone is
a less reliable indicia of probable cause than the indicia
previously considered. Justifying Brignoni solely on the basis of
the racial characteristics of the occupants of the automobiles
would therefore seem to extend Terry in both directions.

Thus, simple consistency with prior law would indicate that
something more than simple racial characterist i cs should be
required to justify a warrantless stop.
In addition to these more technical legal considerations,
I continue to be quite troubled by the palatibility of an
opinion that rests exclusively on the racial characteristics
of the occupants of the automobile.

First, there is the

obvious problem of writing some things that we all know to
be true.

The clerks I have spoken to in the past few hours

evince vastly different reactions to the problem, ranging from
cautious acceptance that r ecognition of such a factor is
simply an exercise in judicial candor to opinions that such
an opinion would be a di saster .

And, one' s aesthetic reactions

aside, it seems apparent that racial characteristics are a
significantly overinclusive criterion .

As was pointed out in

oral argument, the Mexican American component of the population
of San Diego county is some 40-50%. I would imagine that the
racial component of other border counties might be equally as
high if not higher.

It thus would seem unwise to indicate that

this factor alone would justify an automobile stop in virtually
all cases arising in 8Aproximity to the border that is similar
to that of Brignoni.
I think that the preferable approach is to indicate that
the officer's ability to stop rests on a combination of factors,of
the
Aracial characteristics of the occupants \, i s Q only one.
which~

Not only is this approach more consistent wi th the Terry line
of cases, it

is, r.~I- suspect,

more acceptable "politically."

I find the preferable approach to be some variant of
that adopted by the Ninth Circuit in its recent line of decisions •
The articulated standard is "founded suspicion," and at
least one decision has i nd i cated i n specific terms that a
"founded suspicion" must be more than a suspicion based on
racial appearance alone.
F.2d 859 (CA

~

In United States v. Mallides, 473

1973), a pre-Almeida case, officers stopped

an automobile containing six Mexican-appearing individuals
in Oceanside California, a city located some seventy miles north
of the brder.

The only additional 'suspicious' indicia apart

from the occupants' apparent nationality was that none looked at
the marked patrol car when it passed.

One officer testified that

that aroused his suspicion; the other indicated that he made it
a practice to stop 'all cars with Mexicans in them that appear
to be sitting and packed in like people in [the suspect] car."
473 F.2d., at 860.

Judge Hufstedler focused on the contention

that the racial characteristics alone might provide a "founded
suspicion":
Tested by objective standards there is nothing
suspicious about six persons riding in a sedan.
The conduct does not become suspicious simply
because the skins of the occupants are nonwhite
or because they sit up straight or because
they do not look at a passing police car. 473 F.2d,
at 861.
Turning to the practice of stopping all automobiles containing
Mexican-appearing persons,

Judge Hufstedler indicated that

that practice was "roundly condemned" in Davis v. Mississippi,

394 U.S. 721, 726-727 (1969).

This opinion was cited approvingly,

and the above quoted portion was quoted by the unanimous decision
of the Ninth Circuit sitting

~

bane in Brignoni-Ponce.

Another decision of the Ninth Circuit, decided after this
Court's decision in Almeida,indicates the practical operability
of the "founded suspicion" concept.
v. Bugarin-Casas, 484 F.2d 853

leA

The facts in United States
9 1973), cert. denied, ____u.s.

____ (1974) were the following. Border officials conducting a
roving patrol of an area some 15 miles north of the border in
a region that was known for a high incidence of smuggling activity
noticed an automobile driven by a man of apparent Mexican lineage.
The agents noticed that the car was riding low in the rear and
'if)
knew from their personal experience that that( particular make
of automobile (some kind of stationwagon) contained a panel in
the rear portion that smugglers often used.

On these facts the

stop was upheld. A panel of the Ninth Circuit felt that the"founded
suspicion" standard was satisfied, distinguishing Mallides as a
oase in which the primary focus was on race. The panel in BugarinCasas indicated that consideration of race was not a fatal
flaw in the agents thought processes, provided the other factors
taken into consideration justified the stop. This case was also
cited approvingly in the

~

bane decision in Brignoni o
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While the history of the Ninth Circuit's treatment of
this issue is by no means extensive, it does appear sufficient
to indicate that the Ninth Circuit is developing a workable
system of assessing probable cause for stops that avoids
excessive reliance on alienage. The opinions of the Fifth
Circuit articulated a concept of "reasonable suspicion" even
prior to Almeida, see

United States v. Wright,

1027, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821(1974).
has gone further.

In

476 F.2d

The Tenth Circuit, however,

United States v. Newman, 490 F.2d 993

(CA 10 1974), a post-Almeida case, the Tenth Circuit relied on
the statute alone to justify a stop to inquire of nationality.
It required some additional indicia of probable cause to justify
a search, however. Moreover, the facts of the case are somewhat
more similar to a checkpoint situation than a roving patrol. The
officers encountered the vehicle at a tollgate and asked the
driver to pull over.
In light of these considerations, and in light of the
difficulties discussed in

r ely~g

too heavily on racial character-

istics, I presently am inclined to adopt a"founded suspicion"
concept similar to that developing in the Ninth and Fifth Circuits o
Not only is this test easier to articulate, it provides a degree
of flexibility that seems advisable to enable the courts to
maintain a loose rein on the activities of the police and
border patrol agents.

A founded suspicion concept would, for

example, provide ready basis for distinguishing between apparen tly similar stops that oc cur in different locations. A stop that
might be permissible near the border in an isolated area known
for smuggling activities would perhaps be unwarranted in San Diego.

Finally, that test will inevitably produce fact-specific
applications that the Court can watch for a period of time.
If the courts of appeal are too stringent in their application
of the test, the Court can grant a case and provide additional
flexibility.
The question remains what to do with this case.

The

court of appeals in this case noted in passing that "founded
suspicion" did not exist to support the stop.

I think this

is a close question. Perhaps the decision is justified by the need
to maintain a clear
/distinction between roving patrols and checkpoint stops. That
distinction becomes quite blurred if roving

patro~

type stops

can be conducted at checkpoint locations on nothing more than
the facts of this case. Still,! think this is close.
It seems quite possible that the Government did not press
this point with any dedication in the lower courts. The opinion
of the court of appeals devotes
the question of statutory justification

more attention to
and mentions "founded

suspicion" only in passing. It is possible that the Government
chose to devote their efforts more heavily to the statutory issue,
or simply that they failed to establish an adequate record on
the "founded suspicion" theory. Aside from this speculation
regarding the court of appeals decision, however, the important
fact is that the Government chose not to petition for certiorari
on the "founded suspicion" concept . and the arguments they advance
individualized
in this case are not designed to meet the/standards that that
kind of an approach would require. It therefore does not seem
appropriate to reverse the court of appeals opinion on the basis
of a position neither presented in the petition for certiorari
nor specifically argued to this Court. In my v iew, the

1
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affirm the court of appeals in its determination that
a notion of "area-wide probable cause" will not support
the stop at issue.

I would make some mention of the fact

that a question of "founded suspicion" may support stops in
certain cases, but state that that question is not before the
Court. This

approach would both alert the lower courts to

this concept and allow this Court to wait a period of time to
determine how that

conc e ~t

is developing. It seems· possible

that no need will arise to address the issue in the near future.
The concept itself appears to contain sufficient flexibility to
allow the courts of appeals to work out the problems.

Questions to Consider-It seems to me that this approach raises certain questions,
which

should be addressed prior to a decision to go one way

or the other.
~proach

First is the question whether this or any

that allows a stop for the limited purpose of

inquiring into citizenship will largely subsume the warrant
requirement of Almeida. In other words, will the "founded
suspicion" to stop and inquire of citizenship always be sufficient
t o justify a probable cause search.

I have not satisfied myself

of the answer to that question. Certainly in many cases the
degree of probable cause will be sufficient to authorize a
search. It seems to me that there is at least a

the~retical

difference between the two concepts, however, and I am not
persuaded that an opinion might not identify the differences in
amanner that would result in some practical distinction. That
is a problem with this approach, however.

A second problem to bear in 'mind is the question whether
this approach would dic tate a reswlt in the auto license
check situation.

Certainly it would not have an impact on

the checkpoint type situation.

And, while this would

give some indication of direction in the discretionary stop
context, I don't think that an opinion along these lines would
be dispositive.

The distinguishing feature, which could be

emphasized, is that stops of this nature generally are more
"criminal" in nature.

While the illegal aliens might simply

be deported, the smuggler will quite likely be prosecuted.
Auto license checks, by contrast, generally are more purely
"administrative" in nature.
These two prob l PmS are by no means the sole problems
with this approach.

They are simply the first two that come

to mind. I am sure that more will oc cur in the course of our
subsequent conversations.
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g./

Ortiz and Bowen: The Warrant Requir·e ment at Fixed Checkpoints-Although it may be difficult to articulate meaningful
standards governing the decision whether to issue a warrant,
I think that the decision on the basic issue i smore clearcut..

Application of the warrant clause to fixed checkpoint

searches seems to be a logical and necessary result of the
positions you have taken in United States v. United States District
Court and Almeida Sanchez . Thus, it appears that the analysis
should begin with the assumption that the warrant clause
applies unless the Government can demonstrate with some
compelling force that it should not .
The Government's argument on the basic issue of whether
a warrant should be required is two-fold. First, the Government
asserts that an area-wide equivalent of probable cause exists
to support the limited kind of search that occurs at the fixed
checkpo i nts.

Secondly, the Government asserts that advance

judicial approval through the warrant procedure would not
materially enhance the reasonableness of the searches that
occur.

Their argument also is sprinkled with re f erences to

the difficulty of conceptualizing and administering a warrant
procedure.
Addressing the first point, it would appear that the
"area-wide probable cause" that would be thought to exist at
any given fixed checkpoint would be

less than that that would

exist in some of the areas in which a roving patrol is conducted .
As a simple matter of probabilities, I would imagine that the

probability of discovering an illegal alien in a car selected
at random is greater in the area in which the Almeida r@ving
patrol was conducted than it is at the San Clemente checkpoint.
The real focus of the issue thus appears to center on the
intrusiveness of the search.

But as previously mentioned,

the search itself is generally the same in the case of a roving
patrol and a fixed checkpoint; each search is limited to
places in which an alien might hide. The real difference,
assuming all searches are conducted in the manner the Government
says they are, is In the circumstances of the encounter -- the
"threat" factor of the unanticipated roving patrol and pullover
as contrasted to the less frightening encounter with the officers
2

at a fixed checkpoint.

Thus, the Government's argument on the

first point appears to fail.
The second point - that advance judicial approval will
offer no additional protection over what can be obtained through
subsequent motions to suppr ess.

The validity of that statement

of course will depend significantly on the content of the
warrant.

It seems that one value to be served by the warrant

requirement is the obvious function of interposing the judiciary
in the process of conducting a significant number of searches.
The utlimate achievement of that endeavor will depend of course
on what the judiciary actually does, but it seems to me that
there is a certain virtue in the simple judicial participation.
Not only is that consistent with general Fourth Amendment theory,
the spectre of repeated judicial review would seem to encourage
2. The description of the District.Court in Baca indicates
that temporary checkpoints are character1zed by the same show of
authority as fixed checkpoints. Thus, the rational~ for fixed points
would appear to apply equally to temporary checkpo1nts.

the development of regulations and procedures that are more
standardized . Indeed, the warrant procedure might be utilized
to demand this response.

The warrant is obtained

~

parte, of

course, and it would seem to be important to indicate the
relationship of the preliminary warrant and the subsequent
challenge of an individual search on a motion to suppress.
It wouhl appear that the preliminary warrant would authorize
a general procedure - the more standardized and more carefully
outlined the better.

Subsequent motions to suppress would then

serve two functions. First, they would enable the magistrate to
determine in rough
being

followe~.

terms whether the standardized procedure was

An individual deviation from the procedures

authorized that is not justified by the circumstances (as, for
instance, an unjustified decision to look into the glove compartment) should warrant suppression of the evidence obtained.

Repeat-

ed instances of deviation from the procedure, however, should
prompt the magistrate to consider alteration of the procedures
or other methods that would insure official compliance.
It would seem important to indicate this in fairly explicit terms
so that some magistrates would not determine that searches
conducted pursuant to a fixed checkpoint warrant were immune
m subsequent judicial inquiry.

I do not anticipate that a warrant would be able to
effectively control the discretionary decision to refer an
automobile to the side for further inquiry or for further
search.

I simply see no way to anticipate or control that decision

other than imposing some highly artificial limitation that would
neither be protective nor sensible.

Finally, the warrant procedure

might serve some marginal

value in determining the propriety of the checkpoints themselves.
This factor is easy to overestimate. Moreover, this appears to
be potentially the most difficult
judicial decisions.

and .~ disruptive

of the

The warrant requirement would appear to

serve a negative function in this regard.

Since the magistrate's

authority does not extend beyond his own district, his power
to determine the location of a checkpoint on ly extends to
denying the authority to locate a Eheckpoint there. The magistrate
would have to assess the propriety of one location in relation

m possible alternative sites, including sites not located in
his district. If the magistrate determined that some other location was considerably more preferable to that chosen, he
would have to deny permission to locate in his district on the
ho~e

site.

that permission would be granted to locate in the alternative
Given the intangible value of deterrence and the possibly

complex interrelationship of one checkpoint to another, the
judicial role in this regard would have to be a limited one.
The judicial role might be more significantly exercised in
relation to decisions to locate temporary checkpoints, however,
where the considerations are similar but the consequences of
a judicial determination less striking. A decision to deny
permission to conduct a temporary checkpoint at a given location
a~

a given time would be less disruptive of the overall border

control effort, and it might be realiztic to expect that the
jud ic iary would feel freer to exercise a more significant role
in these decisions.

The final alternative, that adopted by the Ninth Circuit,
is to limit the warrant power to the power to stop and
inquire and make subsequent searches depend on the identification of some cause or suspicion that is engendered by the
initial inquiry.

The actual impact of that solution is

difficult to assess. It would appear to depend on how
closely the courts supervise the matter and, quite possibly,
how inventive the border patrol agents are in testifying to the
factors that led them to feel the need for further inquiry.
I also note that this alternative is somewhat inconsistent
with your Almeida opinion ; if probable cause can be found in
that instance to support a search as well as a stop, it also
should exist in this case.

Overview of the System:
there are so many variations involved in this case that it
might be helpful to examine the whole system, anticipating your
vote and the ultimate result o
At the border and the functional equivalents--Everyone
seems to agree that any search can be conducted at this point
and that there is no warrant requirement and no

ju~icial

role.

Roving Patrols-- The general roving patrol can be conducted
pursuant to an Almeida warrant. Additionally, two other stops that
~e

similar to roving patrols would seem to be permissible o

First is a decision to stop an automobile and inquire of nationality
but not conduct a search unless additional indicia of cause arose
during the stop o That is the Brignoni issue 9 , and it seems that the
difficult question is identifying the nature and

L.Vo

quantum of cause that would justify such a search on the
open highway.

One alternative we have discussed is to allow

ocops to be governed by the suspicion engendered by appearance
alone.

For the reasons outlined, I am shying away from that

position . and toward a notion of "founded suspicion" that is
similar to that presently used by the Ninth Circuit.

The

difficulty in this regard is determining whether there is
a reali:Stic difference in "founded suspicion" to stop and
inquire and "founded suspicion" to stop and search.

The doctrine

presently is offered by the Ninth Circuit for both purposes.
I suspect in reality, however, that the "founded suspicien"
in one case is the same as the "founded suspicion" in
the other. In any event, the Ninth Circuit has recognized the
possibility of "founded suspicion" stops ana searches in
roving patrol type situations. That supplements the Almeida
~rrant

procedure.
Fixed and Temporary Checkpoints: I would anticipate that

a decision imposing some warrant requirement on these procedures
fixed
would result in some initial confusion until all of the/checkpoints
are validated.Thereafter, I would anticipate that the decision
to locate temporary checkpoints would be similar to that to
conduct roving pa t rols.

Under present law, the judicial

role will be more constant than I might like, since the warrants
must be renewed every ten days. The spectre of the "chancelor's
foot", to quote the Chief Justice, is apparent.

FILE MEMO
Border Search Cases
This file memo, dictated primarily to focus certain
facts and issues more clearly in my mind, is rough and
incomplete.

There are helpful cert memos in each case, and

also the bench memo prepared by David.
The four border search cases are as follows:
No. 73-2000

United States v. Peltier - roving patrol

stopped and searched 70 miles from border.

The search and

conviction in DC occurred before Almeida-Sanchez.

Sole

question is retroactivity.
No. 74-114 United States v. Brigoni-Ponce - nightime
stop 58 miles north of the border, for purpose of questioning.
This stop occurred pre-Almeida-Sanchez, but the SG in this
argues only the substantive question as to the "stop".
No. 73-6848

- . P~9P and search
t11A- ~~ &'' (p ,
border ~
This is the

Bowen v. United States

at fixed checkpoint 49 miles north of

"key" CA9 decision, holding 7 to 6 that Almeida-Sanchez is
ap plicable to fixed-checkpoint searches.

But by 7 to 6

vote, Almeida was held to create a new constitutional rule
as to fixed checkpoints, and therefore not retroactive to
searches prior to June 21, 1973.
No. 73-2050

United States v. Ortiz - a post A/S stop

and search at a fixed checkpoint (3 aliens were found),

2.
66 miles north of the border.

This is the "cornerstone"

checkpoint operating continuously.

This case also presents

a potential issue of retroactivity:

whether the decision

should apply to invalidate searches conducted prior to the
9th Circuit's en bane decision in Bowen.

Facts Common to All Cases
Section 287(a)

[i.~o,

8 U.S.C. 1357(a)] is relied upon

by the government in all cases.

This was the statute before

us in A/S, authorizing immigration service officers without
a warrant:
"(1) to interrogate any alien· or person
believed to be an alien as to his rignt to be
or to remain in the United States;

(3) within a reasonable distance from any
external border of the United States, to board
and search for aliens any • • • vehicle, . • • "
An Immigration Service regulation defines "reasonable

distance" to mean within 100 miles from any external boundary.
There was no warrant and no "probable cause", in a
Fourth Amendment sense, in any case.

Nor does the government

contend that any of these stops or searches was the
"functional equivalent" of a border search.

3.
Significant Facts and Issues
Peltier
The question presented is whether A/S is to be applied
retroactively.
Respondent's vehicle was stopped and searched by a roving
patrol, 70 miles north of the border, several months prior to
to our decision in A/S.

270 pounds of marijuana were found.

The District Court, acting prior to A/S, denied a motion to
suppress.

Respondent was found guilty and sentenced prior

to A/S, but CA9 - 7 to 6 en bane - reversed the judgment,
holding that A/S must be applied retroactively to cases
pending on appeal.
The rationale of CA9 1 s opinion would apply A/S retroactively
certainly to all cases not finally litigated.*

Judge Goodwin's

opinion stated that A/S neither overruled past precedent of
the Supreme Court nor disrupted long-accepted practice.

The

SG argues, however, that A/S "was a departure from existing
law".

The SG states that this was recognized in Justice

White's opinion in A/S, as well as in my opinion.**
*It is not clear to me that the rationale would not also apply
even to habeas corpus proceedings with respect to cases decided
years before.
**Justice White, at 413 UaS. 298, said that "the clear rule
of the Circuit (CA9) is that conveyances may be stopped and
examined for aliens without warrant or probable cause • . . a"
In footnote 10, Justice White stated that in the "20 courts
of appeals cases I have noted, • • • 35 different judges
of three courts of appeals found inspection of vehicles for
illegal aliens, without warrant or probable cause, to be
constitutional.

4.
The SG also argues that A/S was a new application

ax

of the evidentiary exclusionary rule, and overruled past
precedent in the Courts of Appeals as well as long-established
administrative practice of the immigration authorities.
Finally, the SG argues, persuasively, I think, that
a retroactive application of A/S would not further the purposes
of the exclusionary rule:

that is, it would not deter future

violations of the Fourth Amendment.

Ortiz
This is a major fixed checkpoint case, involving a
stop and search at the San Clemente checkpoint - the
cornerstone of the Immigration Service network.
is a smuggler.

He was stopped and three aliens were found

concealed in the trunk of his car.
is involved.

Respondent

No question of retroactivity

In view of the confusion resulting from A/S,

some 20 cases pending in the Southern District of California
were consolidated in the fall of 1973 for a comprehensive
factual hearing, presided over by Judge Turrentine.

After

"extensive evidence" was submitted, the district judge filed
a comprehensive opinion in which the relevant facts relating
to the magnitude of the problem are summarized - rather
dramatically.

See the SG's petition for certiorari in

73-2050 (Ortiz).

The DC found these fixed checkpoints to

be the functional equivalent of a border search.

5.
But CA9, 6 to 7, in U.S. v. Bowen, held to the contrary,
and applied the rationale of A/S to fixed checkpoints.
Accordingly, CA9 - relying on Bowen - reversed the District
Court in this case.
The arguments pro and con are well set forth in the
opinions of Judge Goodwin (for seven judges) and Judge
Wallace (for eight judges) in Bowen, No o 73 =·6848.

These

opinions should be reread prior to Conference.
On

appeal, the SG substantially abandons the argument

that these fixed checkpoints - remote from the border - are
the functional equivalent of a border search.

Rather, the

SG's principal argument is that -based on the facts applicable
to this particular area of California - there is "an area-wide
equivalent of probable cause for the limited-vehicle searches
conducted at fixed checkpoints."

The special conditions in

this area, allegedly giving rise to the "equivalent of
probable cause" include the following:
(i)

high concentration of aliens illegally

in the U.S.
(ii)

policing national boundaries with Mexico

present "peculiar and difficult law enforcement
problems".
(iii) traffic checkpoints are essential to
effective enforcement of immigration laws.
(iv)

the checkpoint operations are conducted

primarily for administrative rather than prosecutorial

6.
purposes, as virtually no aliens are prosecuted
(only the smugglers).
(iv)

the checkpoint searches involve only a

modest intrusion upon privacy.
(vi)

checkpoint searches have consistently

been approved by courts of appeals and employed for
many years.

An interesting question (especially in view of my
concurrence in A/S) is the feasibility of an area warrant
procedure addressed to specific checkpoints.

Respondents'

brief(pp. 66-69) argues that such procedure is feasible, and
emphasizes that such warrants "are currently issued in various
federal districts throughout southwestern United States."
The SG's brief (po 38 et seg.) argues that a warrant
procedure for checkpoints would be unworkable primarily
because of (i) the necessity or coordination between the
17 permanent and 30 temporary checkpoints in California,
Arizona, New Mexico and Texas, within six different federal
judicial districts, and (ii) the tendency of district judges based on experience to date - to limit the warrants merely
to stopping (in many instances) and to limit the periods to
10 days.

7.
Comment:

Although there is obvious force to the govern-

ment's reluctance to endorse a general area-type warrant or
specific checkpoints, I am not yet persuaded that this
procedure is not feasible - especially if we laid down some
fairly broad guidelines.

In this connection, I wonder if

anything is to be gained from an analogy to authorization
in the wiretap caseso

To be sure, this is pursuant to

congressional legislation.

Bowen
Like Ortiz, this is a fixed checkpoint case.

Indeed,

CA9's opinion in this case is the controlling 9th Circuit
authority applying (by 7 to 6 vote) A/S to fixed checkpoints
on the same rationale as the Court adopted with respect to
roving patrols.
But this case has a retroactivity question not present
in

Ortiz~

CA9 held, again 7 to 9 (but with a different

lineup) that, in view of long-established precedent in the
9th Circuit to the contrary, the court's decision in Bowen
should not be applied retroactively.
It will be recalled that in Peltier, decided May 9,
1974, CA9 applied A/S retroactively to a roving patrol
case, but in Bowen

CA9 distinguished - for purposes of

retroactivity - between roving patrols and fixed checkpoints.

8.

With respect to the latter, CA9 concluded that long-established
authority in the Circuit, as well as administrative conduct,
had established fixed checkpoints as the principal means of
controlling immigration.

Comment:

The single most important issue, as I view

it, to be decided in these four cases is the validity of
searches at fixed checkpointso

The most exhaustive appellate

court consideration of that issue is in Bowen, whereas the
district court decision that is most helpful on the facts is
in Ortiz.

I suppose we could decide the substantive Fourth

Amendment issue in Ortiz ' which is squarely presented there.
We could then confine our decision of Bowen to the retroactivity
issue.

Humberto Brignoni-Ponce
This case, significandy different from the foregoing,
involves only a "stop" with no search.
Immigration officers were stationed at a fixed checkpoint
65 miles north of the border, but which happened to be closed
due to bad weather.

The officers observed passing cars, and

followed respondent's car because its occupants appeared to
be Mexicans.

The three occupants spoke no English and had

no identification papers.

When questioned in Spanish, it

appeared that two of them - the passengers - were Mexican

9.
citizens ±iig illegally in the United States.

Respondent

was prosecuted and convicted for transporting aliens, but
the Court of Appeals - again sitting en bane and again by
a 7 to 6 vote - reversed the conviction.
CA9 fotm.d no distinction between a"stop" and a "search"
in the application of the rationale of A/S.

It recognized

that A/S involved only a search, but pointed to language
(dictum) that appeared to apply the same principles to a stop.
It was conceded that there was no probable cause, and
CA9 concluded there was not even "a fotm.ded suspicion".
The government, essentially, makes two arguments:
(i)

That there exists in fact an area-wide equivalent

of probable

RXXHH

cause that justifies a brief stop of a

vehicle in the Mexican-border area; and
(ii) Advance judicial approval is not necessary to
insure the reasonableness of a brief investigative stop of
a vehicle in this area.
The latter point, which is of considerable interest to
me, is buttressed to some extent at least by the Court's
decision in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17-18.

The SG's

brief (p. 25) states that the Immigration Service "informs
us that a stop for questioning at a checkpoint ordinarily
takes no more than about 5 seconds per occupant and that
even a roving-patrol stop for questioning usually consumes
no more than a minute.

Such stops involve no search rmless

the officers have a particularized probable cause.

10.
The SG also points out that courts have upheld routine
warrantless stops of vehicles for license and registration
checks.

See SG's brief p. 28 and cases cited in note 19.

Comment:

This type of stop is easier to reconcile with

the Fourth Amendment and our cases than a search, especially
if the stop occurs at a fixed checkpoint.

The situation is

somewhat less clear, and the government's position weaker,
where the stop appears to be altogether random by a roving
patrol.

Having in mind the customary checking of licenses

that goes on in Virginia at regular intervals, when officers
at checkpoints stop most cars and check driver's licenses,
the procedure here involved. differs only in that the stops
are confined to automobiles occupied by persons who appear
to be Mexicans.

There may be an Equal Protection Clause

issue, but it is difficult for me to see a Fourth Amendment
distinction.

L.F.P., Jr.
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Border Search Cases
are prepared to assist me in the Conference

I.

Retroactivity

~·-<-- ?-d.~(~ p~ /J.u •.tJ

~ ~

( f<--tcJ CJL.Lt,_~

I would not apply Almeida-Sanchez (A/S) retroactively.
Thus, I will vote to reverse Peltier, and to affirm Bowen on
this issue.
· In Lemon v. Kurtzman we indicated that in determining
retroactivity, we should focus on the practical "facts of
lega~

life".

In view of (i) the decisions in CA9 and CAlO,

(ii) the federal statute, at least arguably authorizing this
conduct, and (iii) the prophylactic purpose of the exclusionary
rule, I view A/S as prospective in its precedential effect.
~(~/

II.

Fixed Checkpoint Searches
-

I .
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/,/Bowen and Ortiz present the central issue, as I view it,
in the border search cases.

In Bowen, CA9 en bane (7 to 6)

invalidated fixed checkpoint searches on the basis of A/S.
There was also a retroactivity issue in Bowen, CA9 holding
7 to 6 that as to fixed checkpoints A/S is not retroactive.
Ortiz involves solely the validity of the fixed checkpoint
search.

I would be inclined to write a single opinion

covering both of these cases.

I would affirm, but in an

L..

opinion which applies the rationale of my concurrence in
A/S to fixed checkpoint searches.
The Choices:

Broadly speaking, we have three choices

as to this issue:

(i) accept the government's theory that

there is an "area-wide equivalent of probable cause", which
is sufficient without a warrant or even without a particularized
"founded suspicion"; (ii) accept respondents' position, adopted
by a bare majority of CA9 (but not approved by CAlO), that
A/S applies as well to fixed checkpoints, requiring"strict
compliance with classic Fourth Amendment standards; or (iii)
as I suggested in my concurrence in A/S, approve a warrant
procedure for checkpoint searches.
None of these alternatives is free from substantial
objections.

The government's position (even though supported

at least arguably by the statute) is without support in our
precedents.

Respondents' position, adopted by 7 of the 13

CA9 judges, would be the easiest to write, as it fits more

.

neatly into conventional Fourth Amendment analysis.

But I

do not think the Fourth Amendment precedents, none of which

address~ this particular problem, command literalistic
adherence in the circumstances of these difficult cases.
Moreover, while our duty is to decide cases in accord with
the Constitution, the Supreme Court cannot be unaware of
the consequences of its decisions.

The need .is apparent for

adjudiation that accords with principle and yet takes into

-'·

account the special facts and manifest public interest which
weigh against stripping the government of the deterrence (as
well asthe more tangible results) of the checkpoints.

Indeed,

Judge Turrentine - who heard several days of testimony - found
that there is no other effective way to limit the alien influx.
A Warrant Procedure.

These considerations bring me to

the conclusion that a warrant procedure , despite some of the
attendant problems, is the best available

answer~

In A/S,

I suggested some of the considerations that would j.ustif¥
a finding of "area probable cause", including the following:
(i) The frequency with which alienis illegally
in the country are known or reasonably Helieved to
be tran~ported in a particular area;
(ii) The proximity of the area in question to
the border;
(iii) The extensiveness and geographic
characteristics of the area, including the roads
therein and the extent of their use; and
(iv) The probable degree of interference with
the rights of innocent persons, . taking into account
the scope of the proposed search, its duration, and
the concentration of illegal-alien traffic in relation
to the general traffic of the road or area.
It is evident that not all of the foregoing considerations
are equally applicable to a warrant procedure for a fixed
checkpoint.

I doubt, for example, that a warrant to conduct

~~a roving patrol in the San Clemente vicinity would meet the
standards I suggested.
But there is a vital distinction between the roving
patrol and the fixed checkpoint.
---·~·-·

~

In my view, a considerably

l

'"'t'o

' I

less demanding standard would be necessary to support a warrant
to operate a fixed checkpoint than to conduct a roving patrol.
The distinguishing characteristic between the two lies
in the circumstances that surround the initial stop and
confrontation.

In each case, the scope of the resulting search

is essentially the same.

But the circumstances attendant upon

the stop (rather than the search) are significantly different:
in the case of a r oving patrol, the stop is usually . totally
unexpected, is announced only by a flashing light and

accompanied~en,

and

on. a. lonely road.

At the fixed checkpoint, by contrast, the

"

~ay

occur in the middle of the night

stop is preceded by visible and reliable signs of authority;
the location is announced by signs and lights, the stopping
officer is uniformed and plainly visible from the outset, and
the overall atmosphere is such as to assure the party in
question that the encounter is official and legitimate.

There

can be little question, also, that the · sense of personal
intrusion upon privacy is appreciably less where a check
obviously is being made of a substantial number of travelers,
in an orderly and relatively public manner.

In such surroundings,

there is little opportunity for police intimidation or "rough"
tactics.

In many respects, the intrusion is no greater than

that when a motorist is stopped at a checkpoint and requested
to display his driver's license.
Assuming, then, that we agreed that a warrant procedure
is feasible, what considerations would justify a district

Jo

judge or a magistrate in finding probable cause to authorize
fixed-checkpoint searches?
Location of the Checkpoint.

All of the considerations

I mentioned in A/S would be relevant in varying degrees but
none would be controlling.

Proximity to the border; the

geographic characteristics of the area; the network of
,
~~-rs -~
highways in the area; the pattern of use of such -pa~
rendezvous between smugglers and Mexicans who make random
crossings of the border, their customary transportation .

,.

routes northward, all would be relevant.

The extent of

'

illegal alien traffic, and the degree of interference with
the rights of innocent persons also could be important in
determining whether a particular location should be authorized.
~
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discretion by the officer as to whom to stop.

as to

I would

hesitate a long time to say that racial characteristics alone
justify stopping and searching an automobile, certainly not
in an area like San Diego county which is 40/50% MexicanAmerican.

Rather, an officer's authority to stop should

depend on the combination of factors, of which the racial
characteristics of the occupants is "only one.
Here, we can gain some insight from the 9th
standard of "founded suspicion".

Circuit~

The facts in United States

v. Bugarin-Kasas, 484 F.2d 853 (1973), cert. den. ____ U.S.
____ (1974) affords some guidance:

"1'

'

There, border officials,

-
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conducting a roving p-it~ some- is miles north of the border
in a region known for a high incidence of smuggling activity,
observed an automobile driven by an apparent Mexican; the
car was riding low .in the rear; and it was a type of stationwagon easily (and frequently) converted for use by smugglers
in transporting aliens.

A panel of CA9 concluded that the

"founded suspicion" ' standard was satisfied.

It also held

that consideration of race was not a fatal flaw, where other
factors also are taken into consideration with race (proximity
to border, aspecm of the car indicating heavy rear loading,
type of car and other suspicious circumstances) combine
to justify the stop.*
My pre sent inclination would be to hold that, pu~suant

~
~

·~~,t,.A

~f'~

~

'P~
~

to a proper check-point warrant, officials at a fixed checkpoint could inquire of anyone's citizenship, and could detain
those individuals for the time required to do so.

If,

,,, however, the officials wish to conduct a search, I would
require "founded suspicion."
Nature of the Search.

·
The warrant procedure that I

contemplate would specify the nature of 'the search that
could be conducted in an appropriate case.

I would anticipate

that the search would be limited to a visual inspection of
'

the areas in which aliens may reasonably be thought to be
*The 5th Circuit also has articulated a conc~pt of "reasonable
suspicion" even prior to A/S. See United States v. Wright,
476 F.2d 1027; and the lOth Circuit has gone even further
in United States v. Newman, 490 F.2d 993 (1974).

7.
secreted.

Searches that exceeded this scope without adequate

justification would be invalid.

Thus, notwithstanding the

existence of the general warrant, an individual whose automobile was searched would remain free to raise that issue
in a subsequent suppression hearing.
In short, I am inclined to sustain a checkpoint stop
and search where (i) a warrant procedure has been followed
to establish probable cause for the location and use of the
checkpoint, (ii) where discretion to stop and search must be
supported by facts which constitute a "founded suspicion",
of which race may be one (but would not be sufficient standing
entirely alone), ana (iii) where the search is limited to
visual inspection of areas where aliens may be secreted. ·
Return· on the Warrant.

Under Rule 41, as presently

in effect, such a warrant can only be effective for 10 days.
If we write along these lines, our opinion should suggest the
need for revision of Rule 41.

Pending revision, renewals

of the warrant can be obtained even though this procedure
isrsomewhat inconvenient to the . magistrate and counsel.

A

"return" reporting on the results of the surveillance, is
required, whether the warrant covers a period of 10 days or
longer.
This requirement should serve as a safeguard against
abuse.

I assume the return would show, as a minimum, the

period of time during which the checkpoint was operated, the

8.

number of vehicles that passed, the number stopped for
questioning, the number actually . searched, and the results.
Although the analogy is not entirely complete, the
type of procedure outlined above is generally consistent in
theory with our wiretap cases, especially Katz and U.S.
District Court.

I also think we draw doctrinal support from

the rationale of Terry · and its progeny.
I do not suggest that the Government will be happy with
the foregoing resolution.

There will be a good many practical

difficulties, especially those arising from the ten-day
limitation and from the importance of coordination between
various geographic areas, coordination as to standards,
consistency of the application thereof, location of the
checkpoints, timing of the operation and the like.

But until

the Congress enacts new legislation prescribing standards
and methods of coordination, we will simply have to reply
on the common sense of the federal courts in the states in
question.
III.·

The Stop for Questioning (Brignoni-Ponce)
The SG argues only the substantive question as to the

yalidity of the stop.

I view this as a "roving patrol" stop.

The fixed checkpoint was closed at the time and the officers
"gave chase".

The arrest resulted when it appeared that the

passengers were alien Mexicans.

There was no search.

9.

CA9 found no distinction between a ''stop" and "a search"
under the rationale of A/S.

While A/S did not decide the

"stop" issue, for reasons indicated below I am inclined to
agree that there is no significant difference in legal and
practical consequences.
If a stop is to be meaningful, in the sense that the
party stopped is forced to remain for · questioning (even for
a few seconds, as the SG argues) , there is a "sei'z ure" rmder
the Fourth Amendment.

And that Amendment draws no distinction

between searches and seizures.

There is, however, the Terry

gloss on strict Fourth Amendment analysis.

In reviewing the

Terry line of cases (Terry, Peters, Sibron and Adams), one
must conclude - I think - that there was in each of these a
more particularized reason for suspicion than that present
in Brignoni, where apparently the only articulated reason
for the stop was the Mexican appearance of the occupants of
the car.

The Court of Appeals concluded that there was

no "founded suspicion" supporting this stop, and that issue
is not before us.

-ttl

L. F. P., Jr.
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March 13, 1975

Border Search Cases
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE :
I thought it might be helpful if I shared with you this
memorandum on the latest decision relating to the border
search cases we considered in February. In United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, et al, Nos. 74-2462, 74-2568, 74-2714 (March
5, 1975), a panel (2 to 1) of the Ninth Circuit invalidated
the "warrant of inspection" issued by the District Court to
authorize the operation of the fixed checkpoint at San Clemente.
The warrant there considered authorized agents "to stop
northbound motor vehicles for the purpose of making routine
inquiries to determine the nationality and/or immigration
status of the occupants," and also "to conduct a routine
inspection of said vehicles for the presence of aliens."
The latter authorization appears to have been interpreted by
the Government to empower agents to search trunks and other
places where persons might hide. But the validity of that
authorization was not an issue in these appeals,* and the
court noted that subsequent warrants limited the agents to lA
a stop and inquiry procedure.
f\
The Ninth Circuit's opinion indicates that the warrant
was issued for ten-day periods and had been renewed 26 times.
*In each of the three cases considered by the Ninth
Circuit the stop and inquiry, without search, revealed that
the automobile contained illega aliens.
n United States
v. Guillen, No. 74-2714, a subsequent search of the trunk
revealed additional illegal aliens. The court assumed in
that case that the initial discovery provided probable cause
to inspect the trunk, and therefore did not consider that
search to have been conducted pursuant to the warrant's
"inspection" authorization.

- 2 -

The District Court required the compilation of statistics
relating to the operation of the checkpoint, and the Ninth
Circuit opinion summarizes this data. These indicate that
an average of 1,200 vehicles pass through the San Clemente
checkpoint per hour and that at peak times the figure
increases to 2,500. By the Ninth Circuit's calculation,
this suggests that over 10-1/2 million automobiles pass
through that checkpoint annually.
The more interesting figures are those compiled during
an eight-day period in June of 1974. Over that period
approximately 145,960 vehicles passed through the checkpoint
during periods in which it was operating. Presumably all of
that number were required to slow down to allow the officer
at the "point" to scan the vehicle and its occupants and
determine whether further inquiry was warranted. But only
820 of the almost 146,000 vehicles were "stopped" and referred
to a secondary area for questioning regarding citizenship and
immigration status. And of the 820 "stopped", 202 were
"inspected".
The Ninth Circuit suggested that it was unable to ascertain
exactly what an "inspection" was. But it apparently is something less than a search. The court noted that deportable
aliens were discovered in "plain view" in 169 of the 202
vehicles so "inspected". The court further indicated that
agents searched portions of the vehicles in which aliens
might hide in 33 instances, each allegedly with the consent
of the driver, and discovered illegal aliens in two of the
automobiles so searched.* In total, agents discovered 725
~eportab~e aliens in 171 vehicles during the eight-day period

II

~n

quest~on.

*I would suppose that in virtually all of the 169 instances
in which the initial questioning revealed illegal aliens in
"plain view" the agents conducted a further search of the
automobile. See note 1, supra. In those cases the subsequent
search would appear to be supported by concrete probable cause
and justifiable under more traditional Fourth Amendment
principles. I assume, therefore, that the 33 instances
identified as searches are cases in which the initial inquiry
does not itself reveal the presence of illegal aliens but does
suggest the need to inquire further. Whether "probable cause"
or "founded suspicion" existed in these cases would be a
matter to be determined on the facts of the particular case.

- 3 -

Relying primarily on these statistics, the Ninth Circuit
determined that the "inspection warrant" system was invalid.
Judge Duniway noted that of the nearly 146,000 automobiles
passing through the San Clemente checkpoint only 171, or
0.12%,were found to contain illegal aliens. He considered
this to be too low an incidence to justify what he viewed as
an "intolerable" degree of interference imposed on the
motorists passing through the checkpoint:
"Roughly 999 of every 1,000 cars passing through
the checkpoint carry only persons who are lawfully
within the country and under Carroll are entitled
'to use the public highways [and] have a right
to free passage without interruption.' Although
the duration of a stop and even a detention for
immigration questioning may be brief, the concentration of illegal alien traffic is too small.
We cannot countenance the cumulative intrusion of
stopping ten million cars per year where only one
out of 1,000 passing cars may contain aliens
illegally within the country."
Judge Duniway devoted a major part of his opinion to
my concurrence in Almeida, viewing it, I must say, with little
enthusiasm. In addition to finding that the checkpoint
authorization would not meet the general standards outlined
in my Almeida concurrence, Judge Duniway's opinion held
flatly:

~J

Judge Carter, dissenting, viewed the case quite
differently, and I am inclined to agree with the essence
of his opinion. The undisputed facts clearly indicate that
(i) the checkpoint was used with restraint and discrimination;
(ii) only a minute fraction of the motoring population was
inconvenienced in any way except by being required to slow
down - hardly an "intolerable inconvenience" to motorists
who are accustomed - as we all are - to stop and yield signs
and occasionally being stopped for license checks; and (iii)
of the vehicles stopped for brief questioning as to
nationality and immigration status, one out of every five
(20%) was found to be transporting aliens - an extraordinarily
high percentage of successes .
•

- 4 It is to be remembered that this op~n~on invalidates a
simple stop and inquiry procedure. What I said in Almeida
applied to full searches by roving patrols. Indeed, as I
indicated at our Conference, I would not be inclined to
extend my Almeida standards to authorize searches at a
checkpoint 66 miles from the border and on a highway with
this level of traffic. I would require some more particularized
"cause" to justify an actual search of the private portions
of automobiles stopped at a fixed checkpoint. But there is ~~•r 4
a controlling difference, in my view, between a checkpoint ~,4.~~
warrant authorizing searches and one limited to routine
questions which any motorist should be willing to answer.
There simply is no comparison between the degree of
a •••t.
"intrusiveness" of a search and a stop only to inquire as to
L __.,
nationality and immigration status.
~~
~

Judge Duniway, by relating the number of vehicles
~
in which aliens were found during the period in question ~LL-~.~~c-_--:: _A
to the total number of vehicles passing the checkpoint,
~~
concludes that the results do not justify the "intolerable"d•c-4
inconvenience imposed upon motorists. I do not consider
~~-- ~
discovery of 725 deportable aliens during the course of
~~
a part-time operation of the checkpoint over eight days to
be an inconsequential result. Th!s OEeration apprehended
nearly 100 aliens per day. Moreover, tliese £igures ao not
taKe Into acconfit the number of smugglers and aliens
"deterred" from attempting to go northward, a factor
emphasized by Judge Turrentine in his district court opinion
in United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398 (S.D. Cal. 1973).*

__

The situation in the Ninth Circuit is further confounded
by the decision of another panel in United States v. Evans,
*Judge Turrentine's opinion in Baca, which is printed in
the petition for cert. in No. 73-205n:-contains the most
exhaustive statement of the facts with respect to this problem.
Its findings differ from the opinion of Judge Duniway in
significant respects. The latter thought that "the influx
of illegal aliens could conceivably be stemmed in various
ways" other than by use of checkpoints. Judge Turrentine,
on the other hand, concluded that "the evidence presented
. . . clearly establishes that there is no reasonable or
effective alternative method of detection and apprehension
available to the border patrol • . . . " See Pet. for Cert.
in No. 73-2050 2 at 20a. That opinion also provides an
additional ind~cation
of the importance of the San Clemente
checkpoint, revealing that in fiscal year 1973 over 12,000
deportable aliens were apprehended there. Id., at 25a.
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507 F.2d 879, 880 (CA9 1974). In Evans, no constitutional
defect was found where motor traff~c was simply diverted into
a zone where it could be observed by officers. In that case,
an automobile had been "waived through" a fixed checkpoint
without being required to pull over. As the automobile
passed, however, an officer noticed aliens lying in the
space between the front and back seats and the car was then
stopped. The appellant argued that the "slow down", which
allowed the officer to look into the automobile,was itself
a violation of Fourth Amendment rights since it was conducted
without a warrant or probable cause. The Ninth Circuit panelr-rejected that contention, holding that there is no constitutional objection to a warrantless "diversion of motor traffic
into a zone where it can be observed by officers." Id., at
880.
-In view of these two recent cases, following those
pending before this Court, the law of the Ninth Circuit is
in a state of shambles. Martinez-Fuerte, which was decided
after Evans, mentions the latter only in a footnote and
purports to distinguish that case on the ground that it did
not involve a stop. When one attem~s to rationalize the two,
the result seems to be as follows: Under Evans, government
agents may erect a checkpoint anrohere and, without a warrant
of any kind, compel traffic to s ow down sufficiencly to
allow an effective visual inspection of vehicles and their
occupants. If that inspection arouses "founded suspicion"
the vehicle can be stopped for inquiry, and if probable cause
exists it can then be searched. Yet Martinez-Fuerte applies
the Fourth Amendment with full vigor even to a "fleeting stop,"
and invalidates a warrant authorizing operation of a fixed
checkpoint at an appropriate place and resulting stops for
the limited purpose of inquiring into nationality and
immigration status. In short, a slow down anywhere for
visual inspection is valid, whereas a fleeting stop for
questions is invalid even when authorized by a checkpoint
warrant. The purposes of both procedures are identical and
the degree of intrusion is likely to be indistinguishable.
If immigration officers in CA9 find little rationality
in these distinctions, they are not alone.
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In view of the foregoing, and the present inconclusiveness of our tentative votes at the Conference on the
cases that have been argued, it occurs to me that perhaps we
should relist these cases for a further Conference discussion. If a Court cannot be assembled, the cases presumably
should be set for reargument early next fall and some thought
should be given as to what stays, if any, should be entered
pending final resolution.

L.F.P., Jr.
ss

.__
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CHAMBERS OF"

April 1, 1975

.JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, .JR .

FILE COP)'
PLEASE RETURN
TO FILE
Border Search Cases
Dear Chief:
In a conversation today with Chief Judge John Brown
of the Fifth Circuit, he again expressed the hope that
we will be able to decide the Border Search Cases this
Term.
Judge Brown stated that the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals is holding some 15 to 20 cases, awaiting our
decision. He emphasized, however, that the more serious
problem is the backup of cases in the United States
prosecutors' offices in the Southern and 'vestern Districts
of Texas.
It is estimated that some 200 prosecutions are
being postponed pending our decision.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

April

No. 73-2050,
<:.

f•

MEMORANDUM TO THE

,,.

,\~

In view of the circulation of a memorandum on these
cases by Bill Douglas, I thought perhaps I should say that
I am working on a memorandum as requested by the Chief
Justice. , As I plan to attend the Fifth Circuit Conference
the early part of next week, it will be another ~endays
before I can circulate my memorandum. ·
.·· 4:

,,

...

\/''
"

t;.~

'.

.jlt}tttmt Qfttu.rt ttf tqt ~b .jtaftg

'Jlagqmghttt. ~.

<!f.
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CHAMBERS OF"

May 28, 1975

..JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

Re: No. 73-2050-- U.S. v. Ortiz

Dear Lewis:
I agree with your memorandum in this case
and would join it as an opinion of the Court.
Sincerely,

fltMr. Justice Powell
cc: The Conference

<!fltltrl 4lf tlrt ~b ,jhdtg
'JJMJrittgftm.lO. Qf. 20bi~'

.i'ttpTmtt

CHAMBERS OF

/

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

May 28, 1975

No. 73-2050, U. S. v. Ortiz
Dear Lewis,
I agree with your memorandum in
this case and would join it as an opinion of
the Court.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

~u:pnm.c

QJomt of ur~ ~ttiltb ~fa:ltg
'J)ttra:s-Irittgfott, If~. <!f. 20~~.;l

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS

/

June 4, 1975

Dear Lewis:
RE:

UNITED STATES V. ORTIZ, 73-2050
UNITED STATES V. BRIGNONI-PONCE, 74-114
BOWEN V. UNITED STATES, 73-6848

If your memoranda in these cases become opinions for the
Court, I vote as follows:
In UNITED STATES V. ORTIZ, 73-2050, please join me.
In UNITED STATES V. BRIGNONI-PONCE, 74-114, I shall file
a separate statement concurring in the result.
In BOWEN V. UNITED STATES, 73-6848, I shall dissent for
reasons stated in my dissent in UNITED STATES V. PELTIER, 73-2000.

William 0. Douglas

Mr. Justice Powell
cc:

The Conference

~ltftUlltt

Qfourl ttf f4~ ~triftb ~taftg

~asfrin.ghm, ~. QJ'. 2ll.?'-~~
C H AMBERS OF

.JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, .JR .

June 6, 1975

PERSONAL
Border Search Cases
Dear Chief:
Although I am grateful for the vote in Bowen, I am
quite disappointed that you think we have not "found the
key" to the proper resolution of Brignoni-Ponce and Ortiz.
I write primarily to suRgest that we are unlikely to
find five votes for any "key more to your liking. This
is a judgment (with which you may disagree entirely) based
on my having devoted more time to the study of these cases
than to any other assignment you have given me this year.
The drafts which I have circulated are in accord on
principle with Fourth Amendment precedents, the most recent
of which is Almeida-Sanchez. In one respect, however, it
can be said that I have departed somewhat from precedent.
In Brignoni-Ponce, I proposed a "reasonable suspicion"
standard for random stopping and questioning of occupants
of vehicles by roving patrols. This affords more leeway
to law enforcement officers than any prior Fourth Amendment
case with which I am familiar, although I drew heavily on
Terry and Adams.*
I do not believe that the "reasonable suspicion"
standard will unduly handicap officers on roving patrol.
*In those cases, as you will recall, the investigating
officers had reasonable grounds to believe that the
suspects were armed and that they might be dangerous.
This is a considerably higher requirement than the "reasonable suspicion" which I propose in Brignoni-Ponce.
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I invite your attention particularly to Part IV of my
Brignoni-Ponce opinion (p. 10-12) for the "factors [that]
may be taken into account in deciding whether there is a
reasonable suspicion to stop a car in the border area".
With this portion of my opinion in mind, I further invite
you to read Bill Douglas' concurrence, circulated June 5, in
which he attacks the "reasonable suspicion" proposal.
It is thus evident that, so long as the composition of
the Court remains as it is now, the resolution I propose is
likely to be the closest to your tentative views. Putting
it differently, we have the same 5 to 4 split that decided
Almeida-Sanchez, except that Bill Douglas would require an
even higher standard than I propose. Absent a change in
the personnel of the Court, it is unrealistic to think that
the result will be different at any future Term - unless
Justices Brennan or Marshall retreat from my position to
that of Bill Douglas.
It is also entirely speculative whether a change in
Court composition will create a new majority.* We hope there
will be no change for many years; we have no idea which Justice
will be the first to leave; and we certainly have no idea as
to the views of the Justice who might fill a vacancy.
Of course, we do not have to agree on a Court opinion.
But examples that come to mind (e.g., Metromedia) have hardly
been satisfactory to the bench or oar. The Border Search
Cases present an especially pressing problem, with courts
and U.S. Attorneys in four states awaiting definitive
guidance. I am sure we all would regret further delay or
a fractured Court.
As you know, we also have pending here cases which
present the validity of random stops for questioning at
established checkpoints. These are perhaps the most im~ortant
of all of these cases. I confirm what I said at Friday s
Conference, namely, that I have carefully considered the
*I do not imply that the possibility of a future change
affects any of our judgments. I am merely exploring whether
it is realistic to think the present situation will change.
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issue, and will vote to affirm the right of the border patrol
officers to make such stops - without requiring reasonable
suspicion - at the established checkpoint. Potter expressed
the same view at Conference, and has confirmed it to me personally. I think there is a vast difference between the
circumstances of the regularized stops at established checkpoints (which are quite analogous to stopping vehicles for
license checks), and the random stops by roving patrols at
any time of day or night on any road or highway within a
hundred miles of the border.
You may recall Bill Rehnquist's statement that he might
consider joining me if I made clear that we were implying no
view with respect to stops by state and local officers for
such purposes as checking driver's licenses, auto registration,
weighing trucks or enforcing agricultural quarantines. I
attach a proposed new footnote to be added to Brignoni-Ponce.
I do not know whether this will satisfy Bill.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss

Footnote 8, for p. 9 in Brignoni-Ponce. (The note
reference would appear after the word "Amendment" at
the end of the long paragraph).
8.

Our decision is based on an assessment of

the Border Patrol's function, its statutory authority
for stopping vehicles, and the character of stops for
quesioning in the border areas.

We imply no view as to

issues that may arise with respect to state and local
law enforcement practices of stopping vehicles for such
purposes as checking driver's licenses and auto
registration, weighing trucks, or enforcing agricultural
quarantines.

.iu.p-rtntt Ofo:ttrl t1f tl{t ~tt~ .itzdtg
Jfufringht~ J}. Of. 2ll~'!~
CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

June 9, 1975
PERSONAL
Re: Nos. 73-2050 -United States v. Ortiz
74-114 - United States v. Brignoni-Ponce
73-6848 - Bowen v. United States

Dear Lewis:
I'm sorry to ''let you down" on the Border Search cases.
There is, of course, no Court opinion resolving these troublesome
issues. And the vexing aspect of the plurality opinion in AlmeidaSanchez is that it has been followed by an unemployment figure exceeded only by the number of illegal aliens reliably estimated to be
in the United States.
I argue for no nexus between the two except that they coincide.
I add to that what I said in some dissenting opinions over the past 20
years, that we are becoming an "impotent society. 11 With a shocking
rise in crime, both in prosperity and recession, we are constantly -and blandly-- telling the society we serve "you can't get there from
here.''
Here, as elsewhere, the key lies in the irrational, monolithic,
mechanical application of the Suppression Doctrine, fulfilling Cardozo's
prophecy on it once a month if not more.
You have my vote on the Border cases if you link it with a sane,
selective use of exclusion -- as in Engl"fd, Israel, and every other
civilized country in the world save ours.

Mr. Justice Pow ell

.hprtmt Q}ottriltf t!rt ~h .itatt•
-ufri:ttgbm. ~. (!}. 2ll~'!..;l
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

June 9, 1975

Re:

No. 73-2050 - United States v. Ortiz
No. 74-114 - United States v. Brignoni-Ponce

Dear Lewis:
I am still unable to join your proposed opinions
for these cases. I remain where I was at the time of our
conference.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell
cc:

The Conference

/
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C HAM BERS O F

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

June 10, 1975

Re:

No. 73-2050 - United States v. Ortiz

Dear Brethren:
I have already confided to you, at greater length than
you probably thought was desirable, my thoughts in connection
with United States v. Brignoni-Ponce. I would suggest a
somewhat similar approach in Ortiz. I think the same considerations apply, and that we would accomplish something if we
could get some changes in Lewis' present draft which would
save in substance, as well as in form, the question of the
validity of a stop at a fixed checkpoint. To this end, I
would propose the following changes:

(1) An addition to go after the last
sentence in present footnote 1, page 3,
to make it clear that the description of
inspec ~on ~ontained in the first sentence
of that footnote does not necessarily mean
that every such inspect1on is a "search"~
for example, I would think if a car is lawfully stopped, the Border Patrol officer
might lie on the ground and look under the
chassis without that action constituting
a search:
"To the extent that the various
facets of such inspections constitute
'searches' for purposes of the Fourth
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Amendment, we held in Almeida-Sanchez,
supra, that when conducted by roving
patrols away from the border they are
subject to a requirement of probable
cause."
(2) A replacement for the present sentence
on page 4, beginning on the seventh line
from the bottom, in order to draw a sharper
distinction between a stop and a search:
"While these differences between a
roving patrol and a checkpoint would
have a good deal of significance in
determining the propriety of the stop,
which is a far lesser intrusion than
a search, Terry v. Ohio, supra, they do
not appear to make any difference in
the search itself. The greater regularity
attending the stop does not mitigate
the invasion of privacy that a search
entails."
(3) A replacement for the two consecutive
sentences beginning on the fifth line £rom
the bottom of page 5 and ending on the fourth
line from the top of page 6, in order to
focus the Fourth Amendment analysis of this
case on the evils of a search under these
conditions, and not on a more generalized
concept of Fourth Amendment rights which
could include a stop as well:
"The imperative of the Fourth Amendment
is that a law enforcement officer's
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reasons for breaching a citizen's
protected privacy in conducting a
search must be judged against an
objective standard."
Again, I not only do not know your respective reactions
to these proposals, but I know nothing of Lewis' reactions.
If, mirabile dictu, they should prove agreeable to all
concerned, I would suggest a separate concurring statement
in Ortiz something like that which I suggested in BrignoniPonce.
Sincerel~

The Chief Justice
Mr. Justice White
Mr. Justice Blackmun

(k0
68

CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 5

Honorable Edward A. Infante, Magistrate, U. s...-District Court for
the Southern District of California, requesting a warrant to keep
open its checkpoint at San Clemente, California. After reviewing
the affidavits of two Border Patrol officers, and examining the
facts set forth in United States v. Baca, 25 relating to the need to
maintain such checkpoints, Magistrate Infante issued a Warrant of
Inspection. This warrant, which was issued June 22, 1974, gave
the Border Patrol the authority:
( 1) to conduct an immigration traffic checkpoint on the
northbound lanes of Interstate Route 5, five miles south of
San Clemente, California, and;
(2) to stop northbound motor vehicles for the purpose of
making routine inquiries to determine the nationality andfor
immigration status of the occupants of said vehicles, and;
(3) to conduct routine inspection of said vehicles for. the
r
presence of aliens, . . .2 6
•
Magistrate Infante also included in the warrant certain record
keeping requirements relating to the number of vehicles passing
the checkpoint, the number stopped, the number inspected,' and
the number of aliens discovered, together with a recapitulation
of the number of deportable aliens apprehended. The warrant
with the information required was to be returned within ten days.
On the return date a Border Patrol officer reported as
follows:
A. The checkpoint was operated for a total of 124 hours
and ten minutes during which 145,960 vehicles passed
through the checkpoint;
B. 802 vehicles were stopped at the checkpoint for questioning;
c. 202 vehicles were inspected;
D. Aliens were found in 171 vehicles;
E. 725 deportable aliens were apprehended in vehicles
stopped at this checkpoint;
25. 368 F. Supp. 398 (S.D. Cal. 1973). After the Almeida-Sanchez decision, the Ninth Circuit consolidated several cases and remanded them to the District Court for consideration in light of that decision. After a lengthy factual
analysis, it was the conclusion of the District Court that searches at the San Clemente checkpoint and other checkpoints were border searches for immigration
purposes. The Baca opinion provides an excellent factual analysis of the illegal
alien problem.
·
26. File No. Misc. 399, United States District Court, Southern District of
Califom.ia,
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No property was seized.27

Since June 22, 197 4, similar warrants have been issued to the
Border Patrol by several of the District Court Judges in the
Southern District of California. Magistrate Infante has also continued to issue such warrants. However, these warrants do not
give the Border Patrol authority "to conduct routine inspection of
said vehicles for the presence of aliens . . . ." 28 Under the new
warrants the Patrol's authority is limited to stopping vehicles for
routine inquiry concerning nationality. Any search of an automobile must then be based upon independent facts learned by the
officer that would be sufficient to constitute probable cause.
Operating under the June 22, 1974, warrant, the Patrol
stopped and searched_a car driven by Amado Martinez-Fuerte
through the San Clemente checkpoint. 29 The car carried two persons who admitted to being in the country illegally. The driver
was arrested, charged and convicted of inducing entry and transportation of two illegal aliens into the United States. The case
is now on appeal to the Ninth Circuit, and among the questions
submitted for review is the constitutionality of the warrant. 30
According to Justice Powell, a constitutional warrant would
be one issued after due consideration of a number of relevant factors. In Almeida-Sanchez he wrote:
Although the standards .for probable cause in the context of
this case are relatively unstructured ... there are a number of
relevant factors which merit consideration: they include (i)
the frequency with which aliens illegally in · the country are
known or reasonably l?elieved to be transported within a particular area; (ii) the proximity of the area in question to the
border; (iii) the extensiveness and geographic characteristics
of the area, including the roads therein and the extent of
their use, and (iv) the probable degree of interference with
the rights of innocent persons, taking into account the scope of
27. ld.
28. File No. Misc. 440, United States District Court, Southern District of
California. Some of these warrants are also for checkpoints other than the one
at San Clemente. Of the five Judges serving the Southern California District, two
have held that the warta:nts are unconstitutional. One Judge has upheld the warrants, while another has issued such a warrant and therefore supports ·t heir validity. The fifth Judge has not made his position public.
29. United States v. Amado Martinez-Fuerte, No. 74-2462 (S.D. Cal., filed
July 9, 1974 ).
30. United States v. Amado Martinez-Fuerte, No. 74-2462 (S.D. Cal., filed
Aug. 27, 1974).
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June 16, 1975

13 . 2--0)0
Brignoni-Ponce and Ortiz

Dear Bill, Potter and Thurgood:
You may recall that at our Conference on June 6, (when
these cases were discussed) Bill Rehnquist indicated that if
the opinions were clarified in certain respects, he might
reconsider his position.
I followed up with Bill and he identified two particular
concerns: (i) that our opinions would not apply to state
regulation of highway use, such as enforcement of laws with
respect to driver's licenses, truck weights and the like;
and (ii) that we not foreclose a different decision with
respect to stops for questioning at established checkpoints.
In my view, the draft opinions as circulated left open
both of these issues, as neither was addressed. Bill, however,
has a different view, and he rejected as inadequate some minor
language changes I suggested. He then submitted counterproposals that were quite lengthy.
As the re.sult of negotiations, I submitted the changes
which are now reflected in the pages of Brignoni-Ponce and
Ortiz which I enclose herewith for each of you. Without
comm~tting himself, Bill has indicated an inclination to join
us if we adopt these changes. Prior to seeing my counterproposals Bill had conferred with the Chief Justice, Byron
and Harry with inconclusive results. I do not think my
proposals have been seen by these gentlemen, as Bill thought
it best to know first whether we would submit them to the
Conference.
·
I am willing to make these changes in the draft op~n~ons .
They certainly do not affect the result of the holdings or
change the basic rationale. I expect all of us would come
out at about the same place on the right of the states

- 2 r easonably to govern highway usage. There may be differences
between us as to mere stops at established checkpoints.
Although Byron expressed the view that our decision in
» rignoni-Ponce would necessarily foreshadow a similar holding
with respect to all other stops, I do not agree with hi~.
In any event, the changes which are necessary to satisfy
Bill will still leave each of us free to decide the fixed
checkpoint stop issue as we deem proper.
In sum, I think we have a chance now to bring these cases
down. We will have settled conclusively the "search" issue
at fixed checkpoints as well as by roving patrols; and we also
will have settled the "stop" issue with respect to roving
patrols. These decisions will go far toward resolving the
doubt which now overhangs the entire Border Patrol operations.
In view of time constraints as well as the importance
of a resolution, I suggest that the four of us meet to discuss
the situation. If agreeable, perhaps we could convene in
Bill Brennan's office at say 11:00 a.m. today if this is
convenient. If Mary Fowler will let Sally Smith know, she
will advise Thurgood and Potter.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Brennan
Mr. Justice Stewart
Mr. Justice Marshall
lfp/ss
Enc.

r..
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JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL,JR .

June 19, 1975

Cases Held for No. 73-2050 United States v. Ortiz
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
No. 74-5114 Larios-Montes v. United States
Although the events in this case occurred near a checkpoint, and we listed it as a hold for Ortiz, it has more in
common with United States v. Brignoni-Ponce. Officers at a
checkpoint saw two cars turn onto the highway just north of
them. It was shortly after midnight, no other cars had
passed the checkpoint for some 40 minutes, and these two
cars appeared to be traveling together. The first car, which
had a passenger of apparent Mexican descent, slowed at the
stop sign and turned north~ The second car "skidded" around
the corner with no pretense of stopping. The agents saw
three persons in the front seat and several others in the
rear, who were apparently crouching to avoid being seen. The
car was also riding low to the ground. The agents suspected
that this was a "lead car-load car" type operation engaged
in smuggling aliens. They pursued both cars and stopped them
for questioning. Petitioner, the driver of the first car,
was arrested when his passenger admitted to being an alien
illegally in the country. CA9 held that the evidence obtained
in the stop was admissible under its "founded suspicion"
doctrine. I agree that the circumstances were sufficiently
suspicious to support a stop for questioning, and will vote
to deny this petition.
No. 74-6014 Hart, Bylund, and Dixon v. United States
No. 74-6016 Arnold v. United States
These petitions represent two CAS judgments on two
occurrences at the Sierra Blanca established checkpoint east
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of El Paso, Texas. One involved- Petitioner'Hart in 74-6014;
the other involved Petitioners Bylund and Dixon in 74-6014
and Petitioner Arnold in 74-6016. The unusual joinder of
· Hart, Bylund and Dixon in one petition is attributable to
the fact that they have ·-.t9,e same lawyer.
Petitioner Hart in 74-6014 was subjected to a routine
search at the checkpoint ·. C~S held that checkpoint searches
were reasonable under the Fourth Alllendment. It also seemed
to hold, as an alternative ground, that the Sierra Blanca
checkpoint was ·a functional equivalent of the border, although
there is some equivocation in the opinion, suggesting that
the panel thought that functional equivalency was just a
factor in deciding that the circumstances · of the search were
reasonable. United States v. Hart, S06 F.2d 887 (CAS 197S).
As the checkpoint is 20 miles from the border, on an Interstate Highway, I doubt that it would be regarded as a
functional equivalent under CA9's standard, which generally
requires a reasonable certainty that most cars passing the
checkpoint will have come from the border. United States v.
Bowen, SOO F~2d 960, 96S-966 (CA9 1974). Because it is not clear that the "functional equivalency" discussion was meant
as an independent ground for the decision, I will vote to
vacate the judgment as to Petitioner Hart and remand for
reconsideration under Ortiz. This ~ourse of action should
. produce a clear decision from CAS on the functional equivalency
issue.
Petitioners Bylund and Dixon in 74-:-6014, and Petitioner
Arnold in 74-6016 were also stopped at the Sierra Blanca
checkpoint~
The only issue in their case is the validity
of the stop, as the agent's conversation with petitioners
produced probable cause for a search. The agents at the
checkpoint observed Petitioners' vehicle stop short of the
checkpoint. One agent walked toward it, and the vehicle
moved into the checkpoint. An agent then asked the occupants
for their names, te~phoned -for a record check and obtained
some unspecified adverse information about them. He then
shined his flashlight through the window of the camper
and observed what appeared to be marijuana seed. One of
the petitioners asked the agent if he would let them go if
they gave him their marijuana. Because this information
surely constituted probable cause for a search, the only
question is whether the stop was valid. I question whether
there was reasonable suspicion for the stop, since the only
suspicious circumstances preceding it was the vehicle's
hesitation before entering the checkpoint. Thus, this case

'

'·

l
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could present the issue reserved in Ortiz and Brignoni-Ponce:
whether stops may be r:1ade at checkpoints without a basis for
suspicion. But CAS a f firmed in this case, citing Hart and
saying that if Hart's search was reasonable, this case was
a fortiori. The case is_ therefore infected by the same
ambiguity surrounding the functional equivalency holding.
We could either vacate and remand for clarification, citing
Ortiz and Bri~noni-Ponce, or we could grant the petitio~and
cons~der theunctional equivalency issue, reaching the stop
question if we conclude that this checkpoint is not a
functional equivalent of the border. If we do grant these
petitions,we should probably hold Hart's petition for
disposition of the functional equivalency question.
No. 74-6055 Evans v. United States
This case is unique among the border-search cases.
Border Patrol agents at a checkpoint near Oak Grove, California,
waved Petitioners' vehicle through without stopping it. But
as it passed, they saw two persons who appeared to be Mexicans
-hiding in the rear floorboard. They pursued the car, at
speeds reaching 100 miles an hour, and stopped it. Questioning
revealed that the car contained aliens illegally in the country.
As there was neither a stop nor a search at the checkpoint,
the officers saw only what could have been seen by any person
near the car, and the subsequent stop was based on reasonable
suspicion, CA9 concluded that Petitioners' Fourth Amendment
rights were not violated. I agree, and will vote to deny
the petition.

:f._.1. fl
L. F. P. , Jr.
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No. 74-5114 Larios-Montes v. United States

~
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Although the events in this case occurred near a checkand we listed it as a hold for Ortiz, it has ~re ~n
1
~"'kv
COIPrQ.Q.lJ.,. wi t h United States v. Brignoni-Ponce.
Officers at a
A .~~~~~~~eckpoint saw two cars turn ont o t~ highway just north of
r~~r:--J1 ~nem.
It was shortly after mi~ht, no other cars had
~passed the checkpoint for-sorrie 40 minutes, and these two
/~ appeared to be traveling together.
The first car, which
C~ ::~~ad a passenger of apparent Mexican descent, slowed at the
1
r-~
jtop sign and turned north~ The second car "skidded" around
the corner with no pretense of stopping. The agents saw
ee persons in the front seat and several others in the
.
ear, who were apparently crouching to avoid being seen. The
car was also riding low to the ground. The agents suspected
~ ~ that this was a "lead car-load car" type operation engaged
, §Jnh. 0 in smuggling aliens.
They pursued both cars and s~opp~em
~~ for guestioning.
Petitioner, the driver of the first car,
~~-·
was arres e when his passenger admitted to being an alien
~ illegally in the country.
CA9 held that the evidence obtained
in the stop was admissible under its "founded suspicion"
doctrine. I agree that the circumstances were sufficiently
icious to support a stop for (fUe§'t:ionu11 ' ana wifl vote
eny t LS pe L LOU.
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of El Paso, Texas.

One involved. Petitioner · Hart in 74-6014;

the ~ involved Petitioners Bylund and Dixon in 74.- 6014

and Petitioner Arnold in 74-6016. The unusual joinder of
Hart; Bylund and Dixon in one petition is attributable to
the fact that they have ·· .t~e ~arne laW¥er.
Petitioner Hart in 74-6014 was subjected to a routine
search at the check oint ·. C~S held that checkpoint searches
were reasonable un er the Fourth ~endment. It also seemed
to hold, as an alternative ground, that the Sierra Blanca
checkpoint was ·a functional equivalent of the border, although
there is some equivocation in the opiniori, suggesting that
the panel thought that functional equivalency was just a
factor in deciding that the circumstances ' of the search were
reasonable. United States v. Hart, S06 F.2d 887 (CAS 197S).
As the checkpoint is 20 miles from the border, on an Interstate Highway, I doubt that it would be regarded as a
functional equivalent- under CA9's standard, which generally
requires a reasonable certainty . that most cars passing the
checkpoint will have come from the border. United States v.
Bowen, SOO F~2d 960, 96S-966 (CA9 1974~. Because it is not
clear that the "functional equivalency' discussion was meant
as an independent ground for the decision, I will vote to
vacate the ·udgment as to Petitioner Hart and remand for
recons~aeration un er
~z.
~s course o
act~on shou ld
. produce a c ea
ec~ ~o from CAS o~ the functional equivalency
issue.

ll

- ·

Petitioners Bylund and Dixon in 74-6014, and Petitioner
Arnold in 74-6016 were also stopped at the Sierra Blanca
checkpoint~
The onl · issue i
heir case is the validity
oj the ~p, as t e agent s conversat~on w~t pet~ ~oners
p ~obable cause for a search.
The agents at the
checkpoint observed Petitioners' vehicle stop short of the
checkpoint. One agent walked toward it, and the vehicle
moved into the checkpoint. An agent then asked the occupants
for their names, te~phbned -for a record check and obtained
some unspecified adverse information about them. He then
shined his flashlight through the window of the camper
and observed what appeared to be marijuana seed. One of
the petitioners asked the agent if he would let them go if
they gave him their marijuana. Because this information
surely constituted probable cause for a search, the only
question is whether the stop was valid. I question whether
there was reasonable suspicion for the stop, since the only
suspicious circumstances preceding it was the vehicle's
hesitation before entering the checkpoint. Thus, this case
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could present the issue re s erved in Ortiz and Brignoni-Ponce:
whether stops may be made a t checkpoints without a basis for
suspicion. But CAS affirmed in this case, citing Hart and
saying that if Hart's searr~h was reasonable, this case was
a fortiori. The case is_ therefore infected by the same
ambiguity surrounding the f unctional equivalency holding.
We could either vacate and remand for clarification, citing
Ortiz and Bri~noni-Ponce, or we could grant the petitio~and
conslder theunctional equivalency issue, reaching the stop
question if we conclude that this checkpoint is not a
functional equivalent of the border. If we do grant these
petitions,we should probably hold Hart's petition for
disposition of the functional equivalency question.

.

No. 74-6055 Evans v. United States

This case is ~ni aue among the border-search cases~
Border Patrol agents at a checkpoint near Oak Grove, California,
~~ waved Petitioners' vehicle through without stopping it.
But
as it passed, they saw XW~ persons who appeared to be Mexicans
~
- Qiding in the rear floorboard. They pursued the car, at
~
sp~hin~ lQO miles an hour, and stopped it.
Questioning
revealed tha t =thecar cont a i ned aliens illegally in the country.
As there was neither a stop nor a search at the checkpoint,
~
the officers saw only what could have been seen by any person
-~
near the car, and the subsequent stop was based on reasonable
suspicion, CA9 concluded that Petitioners' Fourth Amendment
~
· rights were not violated. I agree, and will vote to deny
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These two cases are exactl . -like No. 74-6016, __ Arnold ~
v. United States, and the petition of Bylund and Dixon in ~j
No. 74-6014, discussed in the memo of ~ases held for United ~
States v. Ortiz. In each case the petitioner was stopped
~
at the Sierra Blanca checkpoint and, in the course of
11 (
question"lng, Border--Pa:l:ror officers discovered evidence
v;_~ _c.that provided probable cause for a search. In each case ~~
CAS relied on its decision in Hart. If the Court wants to ~~
review the~tional equiva ency issue in hopes of reaching ~
the stop question, these cases slroaidibe held. If the Court
vacates and remands in the other cases, I think these
petitioners should receive the same treatment. I might
add that these Sierra Blanca cases are the only petitions
presently before us that potentially present the issue of
stops for questioning at checkpoints. I was in error in my
memorandum of May 23, in suggesting that several pending
petitions presented this issue. Our options, if we want to
settle this remaining issue,are to p,rant one of these petitions
despite the "functional-equivalency' hurdle, or to wait for
a petition that presents the issue cleanly. My current
inclination is to vacate and remand these petitions and wait.

I

~) No.

r

74-5062 Quiroz-Reyna v. United States
L No. 74-5307 Baca v. United States

These petitions involve stops conducted prior to the
date of decision in Almeida-Sanchez. None of the present

5~~~~~~~~~
~?~~~~~
/

r?--~4 ~~i/v

(?

?v'~

- 2 cases will decide whether the principles of Brignoni-Ponce
should be applied retroactively. I believe, however, that
the rationale of Peltier and the lower-court decisions prior
to Almeida-Sanchez would lead to a conclusion that the Government reasonably could have continued making such stops at
least until the date of decision in Almeida-Sanchez. Because
we are not deciding the retroactivity question, it would seem
approprraee-to vacate t ese ju~ remand to the courts
of appeals in light of Peltier, Bowen and Brignoni-Ponce, but
I could als'o vote to deny the petitions if that is the
consensus.

.

..

4~~~~

The remaLnLng cases represent stops Afor ques f i~~ing
upheld by the courts of appeals on "reasonable sus l icion."
In light of the decision in Brignoni-Ponc e, fne on y Lssues
raised by these petitions will e the application of that
stag£~ to the facts of each case.
For your convenience,
r;:n outline the facts in each case, and indicate how I
intend to vote.

}v-";vw~ ~

No. 74-5422 Madueno-Astorga and Lopez-Saenz
v. United States

\1 ~ f<,
t<A...>t-o

)f1his petition challenges two se parate ingidents. In o .. ~
th~J:st (Madueno-Astorga), Border Patrol agents saw ~~
Petiti oner's car on an Interstate Highway 10 miles from -~~
the border, at 6:50 a.m. They said that the car had a large
trunk and a heavy-duty suspension system, and appeared to
"drift" on curves. They concluded that it must be heavily
loaded, so they stopped it. There were no other suspicious
circumstances preceding the stop. Vacate and remand under
Bri noni-Ponce.
.
~
TH & econd incident (Lopez-Saenz) occurred in the early ~~
morning hours less than halr-a-mrle from the Mexican border, ~n~
in an area "heavily used by alien and narcotic smugglers." : -~
The officer tried to stop a Ranchero pick-up (not Petitioner's
vehicle). It tried to run him off the road, but he finally
~
stopped it. The driver jumped out and fled, leaving the
1/ ct. 1_
pick-up in a ditch. Within 2 to 4 minutes (and before the
officer discovered that the pick-up contained marijuana),
~
another Ranchero pick-up came by. The driver (Petitioner) ~
appeared to be Mexican. The officer stopped the pick-up ~-

' t··.

..

- 3 SUSP,ecting it might be associated with the first vehicle,
and found marijuana in plain view. Petitioner does not claim
standing to challenge the stop of the first pick-up, but
contends that there was no reasonable basis for the officer
to suspect that he was associated with it. Deny.
No. 74 - 6003 Alvarez-Garcia v. United States

~

_
Petitio~~ and a codefendant Wfr~ traveling, about
(I) 5:15 a.m., i~losely-fol~ing ca~ear the border. They
_ -~
w~veling slowly, an
fie trai ling car dld not take
LJV:~
A.
opportunities to pass the leaa car. -petiti oner was a rlving
\'
ne-tead-ca~aer Patrol officers followed them and
noticed that t~railin car was ridin low, despite new
~~
hock absorbers. It also appeare to ave control problems
~~
n curves, leading the officers to believe it was heavily
oaded. The officers stopped the rear car and found -~~marijuana, then stopped Petitioner's car, which also had
~
new shock absorbers but was not riding low. Deny.

1

No. 74-6061 Rocha-Lopez v. Unite d States

vJ~f.( ~

Border Patrol officers saw Petitioner (a Mexican-American)
at 6:40 a.m. on a road 1-1/2 miles from the border in an area
"notorious for smuggtf"ng. Tl The officers testified that normal
traffic at that hour is light and that they can identify most
drivers as local residents. The did not reco nize
titioner.
When Petitioner saw the agents, e Jamme on is brakes,
reducing his speed to 10 mph. On these facts he was stopped
Vacate and Remand.
~

2e

.

~ef'

3

v. Uni
I

a..~

tJ
u+- r<

Border Pat
officers were on patrol in a "notorious
smuggling area" 7-1/2 miles from the border at 2:3 a.m.
Th~ed~ o fnVes f lgate an unusually-place ~ide
the road andJS~ts, leading them to believe that
aliens had been plcked u there. Peti lO r
en rove by
in a ontia s
n o a so
ten used for smuggling aliens.
He was Mexican, a stranger to the officers, and he was
traveling 20 mph in a 55 mph zone. They followed him for
a short distance and stopped him. Vacate and remand.

~

- 4 No. 74-6259

Gonzales v. United States

A Border Patrol officer was on patrol at 5:20 a.m.

1-1/2 miles from the border on a road that parallels the
Rio Grande. The area between the highway and the river is
sparsely populated and is often used by smugglers. The
officer saw Petitioner's truck top a levee, coming from the
border, and turn its headlights on. The officer became
suspicious and signaled the vehicle to stop. Petitioner
tried to run him off the road, but the officer finally
succeeded in stopping the truck. Deny.

L. F. P. , Jr.
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S£RS OF

THE CH I EF JUSTICE

June 2 3, 1975

Re:

/

No. 73-2050 - United States v. Ortiz

Dear Bill:

~

Please show me as joining your concurrence
but I may join only the judgment, thereby limiting my
concurrence.
I will act as soon as Lewis' "whole package"
is clear to me.
Regards,

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference

C!fcurl uf tq.t ~ttittb ~htftg
~lUltittgtctt.lB. C!f. 2!lbi~.;l

~up-:rtmt

CHAM BERS O F

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

June 26, 1975

Re:

No. 73-2050 - United States v. Ortiz
No. 74-114 - United States v. Brignoni- Ponce

Dear Chief:
Please join me in your opinion concurring in the judgment.
I am also joining Byron.

Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
cc: The Conference

..
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

June 26, 197 5

Re:

No. 73-2050 - United States v. Ortiz
No. 74-114 - United States v. Brignoni- Ponce

Dear Byron:
If it is all right with you, please join me in your op1mon
concurring in the judgment. I am also joining the Chief.

Sincerely,

Mr. Justice White
cc: The Conference
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Cases Held for No. 73-6848 Bowen v. U.S.
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:

Some of the petitions raise other issues,
regard any of them as important enough for our
In No. 73-6923, two other persons have filed a
the petition. My recorcs show that we have not
motion.
·

but I do not
consideration.
motion to join
acted on this

~~/
~

No. 74-599 United States v. Speed and Rainer

CAS reversed respondents' convictions for smuggling

~?¥
~A?

marijuana found in their trunk at a checkpoint search conducted

*

C£1-oc/1-.s- ~~~
~ ~~l::f ~C) ~ .
•
~~
~~~-~~~~

~=,£~~~1~~

."
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before Almeida-San · ~hez. In a decision rendered after AlmeidaSanchez the court c oncluded that its pre-Almeida-Sanchez law
required at least a "reasonable suspicion" of illegal activity
for a checkpoint s~arch. My analysis of the Fifth Circuit cases
in Bowen convinced me that CAS had never rejected its early
cases affirming the Border Patrol's authority to search cars
at checkpoints without any basis for suspicion. Bowen slip
op. at 3 n. 1. On that basis I concluded that the Border
Patrol reasonabl relied on that recedent, in CA~ as well
as o er c~rcuits, ~n con uct~ng c ec]?<)int searches prior
to Almeida-Sanchez. The search in this case occurred at a
"temporary" checkpoint rather than a permanent installation,
but that factor makes no difference under either CAS's prior
law, see United States v. Wright, 476 Fo2d 1027 (1973), or
Peltier and Bowen. I will therefore vote to grant the
Government's petition and reverse, citing Bowen.

1_.-f (J
L. FoP o, Jr.
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Cases Held for No. 73-2050 United States v. Ortiz
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
No. 74-5114 Larios-Montes v. United States
Although the events in this case occurred near a checkpoint, and we listed it as a hold for Ortiz, it has more in
common with United States v. Brignoni-Ponce. Officers at a
checkpoint saw two cars turn onto the highway just north of
them. It was shortly after midnight, no other cars had
passed the checkpoint for some 40: minutes, and these two
cars appeared to be traveling together. The first car, which
had a passenger of apparent Mexican descent, slowed at the
stop sign and turned north. The second car "skidded" around
the corner with no pretense of stopping. The agents saw
three persons in the front seat and several others in the
rear, who were apparently crouching to avoid being seen. The
car was also riding low to the ground. The agents suspected
that this was a "lead car-load car" type operation engaged
in smuggling aliens. They pursued both cars and stopped them
for questioning. Petitioner, the driver of the first car,
was arrested when his passenger admitted to being an alien
illegally in the country . CA9 held that the evidence obtained
in the stop was admissible under its "founded suspicion"
doctrine. I agree that the circumstances were sufficiently
suspicious to support a stop for questioning, and will vote
to deny this petition.
No. 74-6014 Hart, Bylund, and Dixon v. United States
No. 74-6016 Arnold v. United States
These petitions represent two CAS judgments on two
occurrences at the Sierra Blanca established checkpoint east

... .,.
- 2 of El Paso, Texas. One involved Petitioner Hart in 74-6014;
the other involved Petitioners Bylund and Dixon in 74-6014
and Petitioner Arnold in 74-6016 .. The unusual joinder of
Hart, Bylund and Dixon in one petition is attributable to
the fact that they have the same lawyer.
Petitioner Hart in 74-6014 was subjected to a routine
search at the checkpoint. CAS held that checkpoint searches
were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. It also seemed
to hold, as an alternative ground, that the Sierra Blanca
checkpoint was a functional equivalent of the border, although
there is some equivocation in the opinion, suggesting that
the panel thought that functional equivalency was just a
factor in deciding that the circumstances of the search were
reasonable. United States v. Hart, S06 F.2d 887 (CAS 197S).
As the checkpoint is 20 miles from the border, on an Interstate Highway, I doubt that it would be regarded as a
functional equivalent under CA9's standard, which generally
requires a -reasonable certainty that most cars passing the
checkpoint will have come from the border. United States v.
Bowen, SOO F.2d 960, 96S-966 (CA9 1974). Because Lt is not
clear that the "functional equivalency" discussion was meant
as an independent ground for the decision, I will vote to
vacate the judgment as to Petitioner Hart and remand for
reconsideration under Ortiz. This course of action should
produce a clear decision from CAS .on the functional equivalency
issue.
Petitioners Bylund and Dixon in 74-6014, and Petitioner
Arnold in 74-6016 were also stopped at the Sierra Blanca
checkpoint. The only issue in their case is the validity
of the stop, as the agent's conversation with petitioners
produced probable cause for a search. The agents at the
checkpoint observed Petitioners' vehicle stop short of the
checkpoint. One agent walked toward it, and the vehicle
moved into the checkpoint. An agent then asked the occupants
for their names, te~phoned . for a record check and obtained
some unspecified adverse information about them. He then
shined his flashlight through the window of the camper
and observed what appeared to be marijuana seed. One of
the petitioners asked the agent if he would let them go if
they gave him their marijuana. Because this information
surely constituted probable cause for a search, the only
question is whether the stop was valid. I question whether
there was reasonable suspicion for the stop, since the only
suspicious circumstances preceding it was the vehicle's
hesitation before entering the checkpoint. Thus, this case

- 3 -

could present the issue reserved in Ortiz and Brignoni-Ponce:
whether stops may be made at checkpo~nts without a basis for
suspicion. But CAS affirmed in this case, citing Hart and
saying that if Hart's search was reasonable, this
was
a fortiori. The case is therefore infected by the same
ambiguity surrounding the functional equivalency holding.
We could either vacate and remand for clarification, citing
Ortiz and Brifnoni-Ponce, or we could grant the petitio~and
cons~der theunctional equivalency issue, reaching the stop
question if we conclude that this checkpoint is not a
functional equivalent of the border. If we do grant these
petitions,we should probably hold Hart's petition for
disposition of the functional equivalency question.

case

No. 74-6055 Evans v. United States
This case is unique among the border-search cases.
Border Patrol agents at a checkpoint near Oak Grove, California,
waved Petitioners' vehicle through without stopping it. But
as it passed, they saw two persons who appeared to be Mexicans
hiding in the rear floorboard. They pursued the car, at
speeds reaching 100 miles an hour, and stopped it. Questioning
revealed that the car contained aliens illegally in the country.
As there was neither a stop nor a search at the checkpoint,
the officers saw only what could have been seen by any person
near the car, and the subsequent stop was based on reasonable
suspicion, CA9 concluded that Petitioners' Fourth Amendment
rights were not violated. I agree, and will vote to deny
the petition.

~.1. fl.
L. F. P., Jr.
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cases Held for No. 73-2050 United States v. Ortiz
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
No. 74-5114 Larios-MOates v. United States
Although the events in this case occurred near a checkpoint, and we listed it as a hold for Ortiz, it has more in
common with United States v. Brignoni-Ponce. Officers at a
checkpoint saw two cars turn onto the highway just north of
them. It was shortly after midnight, no other cars had
passed the checkpoint for some 40rrsninutas, and these two
cars appeared to be traveling together. The first car, which
had a passenger of apparent Mexican descent, slowed at the
stop sign and turned north. The second car "skidded" around
the comer with no pretense of stopping.. The agents saw
three persons in the front seat and several others in the
rear, who were apparently crouching to avoid being seen. The
car was also riding low to the ground. The agents suspected
that this was a "lead car-load car" type operation engaged
in smuggling aliens. They pursued both cars and stopped them
for questioning. Petitioner, the driver of the first car,
was arrested when his passenger admitted to being an alien
tllegally in the country! CA9 held that the evidence obtained
in the stop was admissib e under its "founded suspicion"
doctrine. I agree that the circumstances were sufficiently
suspicious to support a stop for questioning, and will vote
to deny this petition.
No. 74-6014 Hart, Bylund, and Dixon v. United States
No. 74-6016 Arnold v. United States
These petitions represent two CAS judgments on two
currences at the Sierra Blanca established checkpoint east
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of El Paso, Texas. One involved Petitioner Bart in 74-6014;
the other involved Petitioners Bylund and Dixon in 74-6014
and Petitioner Arnold in 74-6016. The unusual joinder of
Hart, Bylund and Dixon in one petition is attributable to
the fact that they have the same lawyer.
Petitioner Hart in 74-6014 was subjected to a routine
search at the checkpoint. CAS held that checkpoint searches
were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. It also seemed
to hold, as an alternative ground, that the Sierra Blanca
checkpoint was a functional eQuivalent of the border, although
there is some equivocation in the opinion, suggesting that
the panel thought that functional equivalency was just a
factor in deciding that the circumstances of the search were
reasonable. United States v. Hart, S06 F.2d 887 (CAS 197S).
As the checkpo!Dt is 2o Dliles from the border, on an Interstate Highway, I doubt that it would be regarded as a
functional equivalent under CA9' s standard, which generally
requires a reasonable certainty that most cars passing the
checkpoint will have come from the border. United States v.
Bowen, SOO F.2d 960, 96S-966 (CA9 1974~. Because it is not
clear that the "functional equivalency' discussion was meant
as an independent ground for the decision, I will vote to
vacate the judgment as to Petitioner Hart and remand for
reconsideration under Ortiz. This course of action should
produce a clear decision from CAS on the functional equivalency
issue.
Petitioners Bylund and Dixon in 74-6014, and Petitioner
Arnold in 74-6016 were also stopped at the Sierra Blanca
checkpoint. The only issue in their ease is the validity
of the stop, as the agent's conversation with petitioners
produced probable cause for a search. The agents at the
checkpoint observed Petitioners' vehicle stop short of the
checkpoint. One agent walked toward it, and the vehicle
moved into the checkpoint. An agent then asked the occupants
for their names, telephonedfor a record check and obtained
some unspecified adverse information about them. He then
shined his flashlight through the window of the camper
and observed what appeared to be marijuana seed. One of
the petitioners asked the agent if he would let them go if
they gave htm their marijuana. Because this information
surely constituted probable cause for a search, the only
question is whether the stop was valid. I question whether
there was reasonable suspicion for the stop, since the only
suspicious circumstances preceding it was the vehicle's
hesitation before entering the checkpoint. Thus, this case

- 3 could present the issue reserved in Ortiz and Brignoni-Ponce:
Whether stops may be made at checkpoints without a basis for
suspicion. But CAS affirmed in this case, citing ~ and
saying that if Hart's search was reasonable, this case was
a fortiori. The case is therefore infected by the same
ambiguity surrounding the functional equivalency holding.
We could either vacate and remand for clarification, citing
Ortiz and Brifnoni-Ponce, or we could grant the petitiomand
consider tbeUnctional equivalency issue, reaching the stop
question if we conclude that this checkpoint is not a
functional equivalent of the border. If we do grant t1He"e:e
petition~,we should probably hold Hart's petition for
disposition of the functional equivalency question.
No. 74-6055 Evans v. United States
This case is unique among the border-search cases.
Border Patrol agents at a checkpoint near Oak Grove, California,
waved Petitioners' vehicle through without stopping it. But
as it passed, they saw two persons who appeared to be Mexicans
hiding in the rear floorboard. They pursued the car, at
speeds reaching 100 miles an hour, and stopped it. Questioning
revealed that the car contained aliens illegally in the country.
As there was neither a stop nor a search at the checkpoint,
the officers saw only what could have been seen by any person
near the car, and the subsequent stop was based on reasonable
suspicion, CA9 concluded that Petitioners' Fourth Amendment
rights were not violated. I agree, and will vote to deny
the petition.

L.F.P., Jr.
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MR. JusTICE WHITE, with whom MR. JusTICE BLACKMUN joins, concurring in the judgment.
Given Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266
( 1973), with which I disagreed but which is now authoritative , the results reached in these cases were largely
foreordained. The Court purports to leave the question open, but it seems to me, my Brother REHNQUIST
notwithstanding, that under the Court's opinions checkpoint investigative stops, without search, will be difficult
to justify under the Fourth Amendment absent probable
cause or reasonable suspicion. In any event, the Court
has thus dismantled major parts of the apparatus by
which the Nation has attempted to intercept millions of
aliens who enter and remain illegally in this country.
The entire system, however, has been notably unsuccessful in deterring or stemming this heavy flow; and its
costs. including added burdens on the courts, have been
substantial. Perhaps the judiciary should not strain to
accommodate the requirements of the Fourth Amendment to the needs of a system which at best can demonstrate only minimal effectiveness as long as it is lawful

.::;

.

73-2050 & 74-114-CONCUR (B)

2

UNITED STATES v. ORTIZ

for business firms and others to employ aliens who are
illegally in the country. This problem, which ordinary
law enforcement has not been able to solve, essentially
poses questions of national policy and is chiefly the busi~
ness of Congress and the Executive Branch rather than
the courts.
I concur in the result in these two cases.
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United States, Petitioner,) On Writ of Certiorari to the
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v.
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peals for the Ninth Circuit.
[May -, 1975]
Memorandum of MR. JusTICE PowELL.
Border Patrol officers stopped respondent's car for a
routine immigration search at the traffic checkpoint on
Interstate Highway 5 at San Clemente, California, on
November 12, 1973. They found three aliens concealed
in the trunk, and respondent was convicted on three
counts of knowingly transporting aliens who were in the
country illegally. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed the conviction in an unreported opinion,
relying on dictum in its opinion in United States v.
Bowen, 500 F . 2d 960 (CA9 1974), aff'd, post p. - ,
to the effect that our decision in Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States, 413 U. S. 266 (1973), required probable
cause for all vehicle searches in the border area, whether
conducted by roving patrols or at traffic checkpoints.
We granted certiorari. 419 U. S. 824 (1974).
Nothing in this record suggests that the Border Patrol
officers had any special reason to suspect that respondent's car was carrying concealed aliens. Nor does the
Government contend that the San Clemente checkpoint
is a functional equivalent of the border. Brief for the
United States, at 16. The only question for decision is
whether vehicle searches at traffic checkpomts, like the
roving-patrol search in Almeida-Sanchl~z, must be based
on probable cause.
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In Almeida-Sanchez we rejected the Government's contention that the Nation's strong interest in controlling
immigration and the practical difficulties of policing the
Mexican border combined to justify dispensing with both
warrant and probable cause for vehicle searches by roving
patrols near the border. The facts did not require us to
decide whether the same rule would apply to traffic checkpoints, which differ from roving patrols in several important respects. 413 U. S., at 273; id., at 276 (MR. JusTICE
PowELL, concurring).
A consolidated proceeding on motions to suppress in
this and similar cases produced an extensive factual
record on the operation of traffic checkpoints in Southern
California. United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398 (SD
Cal. 1973). The San Clemente checkpoint is 62 air miles
and 66 road miles north of the Mexican border. It is
on the principal highway between San Diego and Los
Angeles, and over 10 million vehicles pass the checkpoint
in a year. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,- F. 2d
-, (CA9 1975). The District Court in Baca
described the checkpoint's operation as follows :
"Approximately one mile south of the checkpoint
is a large black on yellow sign with flashing yellow
lights over the highway stating 'All Vehicles, Stop
Ahead, 1 Mile.' Three-quarters of a mile further
north are two black on yellow signs suspended over
the highway with flashing lights stating 'Watch for
Brake Lights.' At the checkpoint, which is also the
location of a State of California weighing station 1
are two large signs with flashing red lights suspended
over the highway. These signs each state 'Stop
Here-U. S. Officers.' Placed on the highway are
a number of orange traffic cones funneling traffic into
two lanes where a Border Patrol agent in ful1 dress
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uniform, standing behind a white on red 'Stop' sign
checks traffic. Blocking traffic in the unused lanes
are official U. S. Border Patrol vehicles with flashing red light-8. In addition, there is a permanent
building which houses the Border Patrol office and
temporary detention facilities. There are also floodlights for nighttime operation." 368 :F'. Supp., at
410-411.
The Border Patrol would prefer to keep this checkpoint in operation continuously, but bad weather, heavy
traffic, and personnel shortages keep it closed about onethird of the time. When it is open, officers screen all
northbound traffic. If anything about a vehicle or its
occupants leads an officer to suspect that it may be carrying aliens, he will stop the car and ask the occupants
about their citizenship. ·If the officer's suspicion persists,
or if the questioning enhances it, he will "inspect" portions of the car in which an alien might hide.,_ Operations at other checkpoints are similar, although the
traffic at some is light enough that officers can stop all
vehicles for questioning and routinely inspect more of
them.
The Government maintains that these characteristics
justify dispensing with probable cause at traffic checkpoints despite the Court's holding in Almeida-Sanchez.
It gives essentially two reasons for distinguishing that
case. First, a checkpoint officer's discretion in deciding
1 Such places typically include the trunk, under the hood, and
beneath the chassis. If the vehicle is a truck, a camper, or the
like, the officer inspects the enclosed portion as well. But an immigration inspection is not always so confined. In Almeida-Sanchez,
the officer removed the back seat cusluon because there were reportg
that aliens had been found seated upright behind seats from which
the springs had been removed, 413 U. S., at 286 (WHITE, J.,
dissenting),
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which cars to search is limited by the location of the
checkpoint. That location is determined by high-level
Border Patrol officials, using criteria that include the
degree 3f ·inconvenience to the public and the potential
for safe operation, as well as the potential for detecting
and deterring the illegal movement of aliens. By contrast, officers on roving pa~rol were theoretically free
before Almeida-Sanchez to stop and seE!-rch any car within
100 miles of the border. Second; the circumstances surrounding a checkpoint stop and search are far less intrusive than those attending a roving-patrol stop. Roving
patrols often operate at night on seldom-traveled
roads, and their approach may frighten motorists. At
traffic checkpoints the motorist can see that other vehicles are being stopped, he can see visible signs of the
officers' authority, and he is much less likely to be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion.
These differences are relevant to the constitutional
issue, since the central concern of the Fourth Amendment
is to protect liberty and privacy from arbitrary and
oppressive interference by government officials. Camara
v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 528 (1967); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966). The Fourth
Amendment's requirement that searches and seizures be
reasonable also may limit police use of unnecessarily
frightening or offensive methods of surveillance and
investigation. See, e. g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1,
16-17 (1968); Camara, supra, at 531; Schmerber, supra,
at 771. The differences between a roving patrol and a
checkpoint, however, ure primarily relevant to the reasonableness of the stop rather than the search. There is
no apparent difference in the search itself, and the
greater regularity attending the stop does not mitigate
the invas10n of privacy that a search entails. Nor do·
checkpoint procedures significantly reduce the like1ihood
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of embarrassment. Motorists whose cars are searched,
unlike those who are only questioned, may not be reassured by seeing that the Border Patrol searches other cars
as well. Where only a few are singled out for a search,
as at San Clemente, motorists may find the searches
especially offensive. See Note, Border Searches and the
Fourth Amendment, 77 Yale L. J. 1007, 1012-1013
(1968).
Moreover, we are not persuaded that the checkpoint
limits to any meaningful extent the officer's discretion to
select cars for search. The record in the consolidated
proceeding indicates that only about 3ro of the cars that
pass the San Clemente checkpoint are stopped for either
questioning or a search, 368 F. Supp., at 411. Throughout the system, fewer than 3ro of the vehicles that
passed through checkpoints in 1974 were searched, Brief
for the United States, at 29, and no checkpoint involved
in Baca reported a search rate of more than 10% or
15%. 368 F. Supp., at 412-415. It is apparent from
these figures that checkpoint officers exercise a substantial degree of discretion in deciding which cars to search.
The Government maintains that they voluntarily exercise that discretion with restraint and search only vehicles
that arouse their suspicion, and it insists the officers
should be free of judicial oversight of any kind. Viewed
realistically, this position would authorize the Border
Patrol to search vehicles at random, for no officer ever
would have to justify his decision to search a particular
car.
This degree of discretion to search private automobiles
is not consistent with the Fourth Amendment. We
stressed in Terry v. Ohio , supra, at 20-22, that the imperative of the Fourth Amendment is that a law enforcement officer's reasons for breaching a citizen's protected privacy must. be judged against an objective

•.
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standard. The Fourth Amendment does not tolerate
"instrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights
based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate
hunches," id., at 21, or the officer's subjective good faith.
"If subjective good faith alone were the test, the
protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the people would be 'secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,' only in the discretion of the police." Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 97
(1964).
A search, even of an automobile, is a substantial invasion of privacy. 2 To protect that privacy from official
arbitrariness, the Court always has regarded probable
cause as the minimum requirement for a lawful search.
Almeida-Sanchez, supra, at 269-270; Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42, 51 (1968). We are not persuaded
that the differences between roving patrols and traffic
checkpoints justify dispensing in this case with the safeguards we required in Almeida-Sanchez. We therefore
follow that decision and hold that at traffic checkpoints
removed from the border and its functional equivalents,
officers may not search private vehicles without consent
or probable cause.8
2 The degree of the invasion of privacy in an automobile search
may vary with the circumstances, as therP are significant differences·
between "an automobile and ~ home or office." Chambers v.
Maroney, 299 U. S. 42, 48 (1969); Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States, supra, at 279 (PowELL, J., concurring) .
3 We have no occasion to decide whether a warrant could issue
approving checkpoint searches based on mformation about the area
as a whole, in the absence of cause to believe that a particular car·
is carrying concealed aliens, because the officers had no such warrant
in this case and had not tried to obtain one. See Almeida-Sanchez
v. United States, supra, at 275 (PoWELL, J., concurring); Camara
v. Municipal Court, supra. We also need not decide whether·
checkpoints and roving patrols must be treated the same for

an
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The Government lists in its reply brief some of the
factors on which officers have relied in deciding which
cars to search. They include the number of persons in
a vehicle, the appearance and behavior of the driver
and passengers, their inability to speak English, the
responses they give to officers' questions, the nature
of the vehicle, and indications that it may be heavily
loaded. All of these factors properly may be taken into
account in deciding whether there is probable cause to
search a particular vehicle. In addition, as we note
today in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, ante, at - ,
the officers are entitled to draw reasonable inferences
from these facts in light of their knowledge of the area
and their prior experience with aliens an.d smugglers.
In this case, however, the officers advanced no special
reasons for believing respondent's vehicle contained
aliens. The absence of probable cause makes the search
invalid.
II
The Government also contends that even if AlmeidaSanchez applies to checkpoint searches, the Court of
Appeals erred in voiding this search because it occurred
after the date of decision in Almeida-Sanchez but before
the Court of Appeals stated in United States v. Bowen,
supra, that it would require probable cause for checkpoint searches. Examination of the Government's brief
in the Ninth Circuit indicates that it did not raise this
purposes, or whether Border Patrol offirers may lawfully stoP'
motorists for questioning at an eiitabhshed checkpoint without
reason to believe that a particular vehicle is carrying aliens.
Cf. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, ante, at - . Nor do we suggest that probable cause would be reqmred for all inspections of
private motor vehicles. It is quite possible, for example, that different considerations would apply to routiJ:le safety inspectiottf
:refJ)!lired. M a conllitiou of :road m~.
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question below. On the contrary, it represented to the
court that the decision in Bowen would be "determinative of the issues in this case." We therefore decline to
consider this issue, which was raised for the first time
in the petition for certiorari.

Affirmed.

f'
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MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the /
Court.
Border Patrol officers stopped respondent's car for a
routine immigration search at the traffic checkpoint on
Interstate Highway 5 at San Clemente, California, on
November 12, 1973. They found three aliens concealed
in the trunk, and respondent was convicted on three
counts of knowingly transporting aliens who were in the
country illegally. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed the conviction in an unreported opinion,
relying on dictum in its opinion in United States v.
Bowen, 500 F. 2d 960 (CA9 1974), aff'd, post p. - ,
to the effect that our decision in Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States, 413 U. S. 266 (1973), required probable
cause for all vehicle searches in the border area, whether
conducted by roving patrols or at traffic checkpoints.
We granted certiorari. 419 U. S. 824 (1974) .
Nothing in this record suggests that the Border Patrol
officers had any special reason to suspect that respondent's car was carrying concealed aliens. Nor does the
Government contend that the San Clemente checkpoint
is a functional equivalent of the border. Brief for the
United States, at 16. The only question for decision is
whether vehicle searches at traffic checkpoints, like the
roving-patrol search in Almeida-Sanchez, must be based
on probable cause.
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In Almeida-Sanchez we rejected the Government's con=
tention that the Nation's strong interest in controlling
immigration and the practical difficulties of policing the
Mexican border combined to justify dispensing with both
warrant and probable cause for vehicle searches by roving
patrols near the border. 'fhe facts did not require us to
decide whether the same rule would apply to traffic checkpoints, which differ from roving patrols in several impor~
tant respects. 413 U. S., at 273; id., at 276 (MR. JusTICE
PowELL, concurring).
A consolid~tted proceeding on motions to suppress in
this and similar cases produced an extensive factual
record· on the operation of traffic checkpoints in Southern
California. United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398 (SD
Cal. 1973). The San Clemente checkpoint is 62 air miles
and 66 road miles north of the Mexican border. It is
on the principal highway between San Diego and Los
Angeles, and over 10 million vehicles pass the checkpoint
in a year. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, - F. 2d
-, (CA9 1975). The District Court in Baca
described the checkpoint's operation as follows:
"Approximately one mile south of the checkpoint
is a large black on yellow sign with flashing yellow
lights over the highway stating 'All Vehicles, Stop
Ahead, 1 Mile.' Three-quarters of a mile further
north are two black on yellow signs suspended over
the highway with flashing lights stating 'Watch for
Br~tke Lights.' At the checkpoint, which is also the
location of a State of California weighing station,
are two large signs with flashing red lights suspended
over the highway. These signs each state 'Stop
Here-U. S. Officers.' Placed on the highway are
a number of orange traffic cones funneling traffic into
two lanes where a Border Patrol agent in full dress
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uniform, standing behind a white on red 'Stop' sign
checks traffic. Blocking traffic in the unused lanes
are official U. S. Border Patrol vehicles with flash~
ing red lights. In addition, there is a permanent
building which houses the Border Patrol vffice and
temporary detention facilities. There are also floodlights for nighttime operation." 368 F. Supp., at
410-411.

The Border Patrol would prefer to keep this checkpoint in operation continuously, but bad weather, heavy
traffic, and personnel shortages keep it closed about one=
third of the time. When it is open, officers screen all
northbound traffic. If anything about a veh\cle or its
occupants leads an officer to suspect that it may be carrying aliens, he will stop the car and ask the occupants
about their citizenship. If the officer's suspicion persists,
or if the questioning enhances it, he will "inspect" por~
tions of the car in which an alien might hide.1 Operations at other checkpoints are similar~ although the
traffic at some is light enough that officers can stop all
vehicles for questioning and routinely inspect more of
them,
The Government maintains that these characteristics
justify dispensing with probable cause at traffic checkpoints despite the Court's holding in AlmeidarSanchez,
It gives essentially two reasons for distinguishing that
case. First, a checkpoint officer's discretion in deciding
1 Such places typically include the trunk, unde•· the hood, and
beneath the chassis. If the vehicle i& a truck, a camper, or the
like, the officer inspects the enclosed por4;ion as well. But an immigration inspection is not always so confined. In Almeida-Sanchez,
the officer removed the back seat cushion because there were reports
that aliens had been found seated upright behind seats from which
the springs had been removed. 413 U. S., at 286 (W.HITE, 3.,
dissenting),

... r'
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which cars to search is limited by the location of the
checkpoint. ·That location is determined by high-level
Border Patrol officials, using criteria that include the
degree 0f inconvenience to the public and the potential
for safe operatiort, as well as the potential for detecting
. and deterring the illegal movement of aliens. By con~
trast, officers on roving patrol were theoretically free
· before Almeida-Sanchez to stop and search any car within
100 miles of the border. Second, the circumstances sur'"
rounding a checkpoint stop and search are far less jntru~
. sive than those attending a roving"patrol stop. Roving
patrols often operate at night on seldom-traveled
roads, and their approach may frighten motorists" At
traffic checkpoints the motorist can see that other vehi~
cles are being stopped, he can see visible signs of the
officers' authority, and he is much less likely to be fright~
ened or annoyed by the intrusion.
These differences are relevant to the constitutional
ir:~sue, since the central concern of the Fourth Amendment
is to protect liberty and privacy from arbitrary and
oppressive interference by government officials. Camara
v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 528 (1967); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966). The Fourth
Amendment's requirement that searches and seizures be
reaaonable also may limit police use of unnecessarily
frightening or offensive methods of surveillance and
investigation. See, e. g., 1~erry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1,
16-17 ( 1968) ; Camara, supra, at 531; Schmerber, I>'Upra,
at 771. The differences between a roving patrol and a
eheckpoint, however, are primarily relevant to the reasonableness of the stop rather than the search. There is
no apparent difference in the search itself, and the
greater regularity attending the stop does not mitigate
the invasion of privacy that a search entails. Nor do
checkpoint procedures significantly reduce the likelihood

·,:
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of embarrassment. Motorists whose cars are searched,
unlike those who are only questioned, may not be reassured by seeing that the Border Patrol searches other cars
as well. Where only a few a,re singled out for a search,
as at San Clemente, motorists may find the searches
especially offensive. See Note, Border Se~ches and the
Fourth Amendment, 77 Yale L. J. 1007, 1012-1013
(1968).
Moreover, we are not persuaded that the checkpoint
limits to any meaningful e~tent the officer's discretion to
select cars for search. The record in the consolidated
proceeding indicates that only about 3% of the cars that
pass the San Clemente checkpoint are stopped for either
questioning or a search, 368 F. Supp., at 411. Through~
out the system, fewer than 3% of the vehicles that
passed through checkpoints in W74 were searched, Brief
for the United States, at 29, and no checkpoint involved
in Baca reported a search rate of more than 10% or
15%. 368 F. Supp., at 412-415. It is apparent from
these figures that checkpoi~t officers exercise a substantial degree of discretion in deciding which cars to search.
The Government maintains that they voluntarily exercise that discretion with restraint and search only vehicles
that arouse their suspicion, and it insists the officers
should be free of judicial oversight of any kind. Viewed
realistically, th1s position would authorize the Border
Patrol to search vehicles at random, for no officer evar
would have to justify his decision to search a particular
car.
This degree of discretion to search private automobiles
is not consistent with the Fourth Amendment. We
stresE"ed in Terry v. Ohio, supra, at 20-22, that the imperative of the Fourth Amendment is that a law enforcement officer's reasons for breaching a citizen's pro~
tected privacy must be judged against an objective
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standard. The Fourth Amendment does not tolerate
"instrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights
based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate
hunches," id., nt 21, or the officer's subjective good faith.
"If subjective good faith alone were the test, the
protections of the Fourth Amendment would evap~
orate, and the people would be 'secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,' only in the discretion of the police." Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 97
(l964).
A search, even of an automobile, is a substantial invasion of privacy. 2 To protect that privacy from official
arbitrariness, the Court always has regarded probable
cause as the minimum requirement for a lawful search.
Almeida-Sanchez, supra, at 269~270; Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42, 51 (1968). We are not persuaded
that the differences between roving patrols and traffic
checkpoints justify dispensing in this case with the safeguards we required in Almeida-Sanchez. We therefore
follow that decision and hold that at traffic checkpoints
removed from the border and its functional equivalents,
officers may not search private vehicles without consent
or probable cause.8
2 The degree of the invasion of privacy in an automobile search
may vary with the circumstances, as there are Slgtlificant differences
between "an automobile and ~ home or office." Chambers v.
Maroney, 299 U. S. 42, 48 (1969); Almeida-Sanchez v. Unitea
States, supra, at 279 (PowELL, J., concurring).
3 We have no occasion to decide whether a warrant could issue
approving checkpoint searllhes based on information about the area
as a whole, in the absence of cause to believe that a particular car
is carrying concealed aliens, because the ufficers had no such warrant
in this case and had not tried to obtain one. See Almeida-Sanchez
v. United States, supra, at 275 (PoWELL, J ., concurring); Camara
v. Municipal Court, supra We also need not decide whether
eheckpoint~> and roving patrohs must be treatf'd. the same for all
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The Government lists in its reply brief some of the
factors on which officers have relied in deciding which
cars to search. They include the number of persons in
a vehicle, the appearance and behavior of the driver
and passengers, their inability to speak English, the
responses they give to officers' questions, the nature
of the vehicle, and indications that it may be heavily
loaded. All of these factors properly may be taken into
account in deciding whether there is probable cause to
search a particular vehicle. In addition, as we note
today in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, ante, at - ,
the officers are entitled to draw reasonable inferences
from these facts in light of their knowledge of the area
and their prior experience with aliens and smugglers.
In this case, however, the officers advanced no special
reasons for believing respondent's vehicle contained
aliens. The absence of probable cause makes the search
invalid.
II
The Government also contends that even if AlmeidaSanchez applies to checkpoint searches, the Court of
Appeals erred in voiding this search because it occurred
after the date of decision in Almeida-Sanchez but before
the Court of Appeals stated in United States v. Bowen,
supra, that it would require probable cause for checkpoint searches. ExaminatiiJn of the Government's brief
in the Ninth Circuit indicates that it did not raise this
purposes, or whether Border Patrol officers may lawfully stop
motorists for questioning at an established checkpoint without
reason to believe that a particular vehicle is carrying aliens.
Cf. United States v. Brign<mi-Ponce, ante, at - . Nor do we suggest that probable cause would be required for all inspections of
private moror vehicles. It is qmte possible, for example, that dif.
ferent considerations would apply to routi1:1e safety inspection~
required as a condition of road use.
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question below. On the contrary, it represented to the
court that the decision in Bowen would be "determinative of the issues in this case." We therefore decline to
consider this issue, which was raised for the first time
in the petition for certiorari.

Affirmed•
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Border Patrol Aagent ~ stopped respondent's car for a
routine innnigration search at the traffic checkpoint on
Interstate Highway 5 at San Clemente, California, on
November 12, 1973.

They found three aliens concealed in

the trunk ) -.None ef theHl 'tttas ent;it;l
S t ates ~

and respondent was convicted on three counts of

knowingly transporting aliens who were in the country
illegally.

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

reversed the conviction in an unreported opinion, relying
on dictum in its opinion in United States v. Bowen, 500 F.2d
960 (CA9 1974), aff'd, _ante, p. ____ , to the effect that
our decision in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S.
266 (1973), required probable cause for all vehicle searches
in the border area, whether conducted by roving patrols
or at traffic checkpoints.

u.s.

824 (1974).

We granted

certiorari.

419

2.
Nothing in this record suggests that the Border
Patrol

o-f-h' ce r-s

~en ~

had any special reason to suspect that

respondent's car was carrying concealed aliens.

Nor does

the Government contend that the San Clemente checkpoint is
a functional equivalent of the border.
United States, at 16.

The

OV\l!,1

pri ~ ~y

Brief for the

question for decision

is whether vehicle searches at traffic checkpoints, like
the roving-patrol search in Almeida-Sanchez, must be based
OV\..

probable cause.
I~

In Almeida-Sanchez we rejected the Government's
contention that the nation's strong interest in controlling
immigration and the practical difficulties of policing the
Mexican border combined to justify dispensing with both
warrant and probable cause for vehicle searches by roving
Th. e.,_ -(a cl s d icl. ")\..-1 t re 1t.A1 " v... s +o d .t C' t' d r 1-0. k.a..tiu Jt..

L +w. s~

"'u...le. w- .v.J.d

patrols near the bo:der.

a-pe~

to

C:Wt:uc:D

1raffic checkpo1.ntsJ .f iffer from

~v-r-r-.

/

roving patrols in severalArespects.

tft3 U.S,,

at ;).._73;

.

td...

at .1_7fo

(MR. 'JusncErbvJE.LLJ ~c..urn'n.g,).

A consolidated

proceeding on motions to suppress

in this and similar cases produced an extensive factual

3

record on the operation of traffic checkpoints in Southern
California.

United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398 (SD

Cal. 1973).

The San

Clemente~

checkpoint is 62 air miles

and 66 road miles north of the Mexican border.

It is on the

principal highway between San Diego and Los Angeles, and
over 10 million vehicles pass the checkpoint in a year.
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, ___ F.2d
The district court in Baca described

'\t.

t

·

0_

----~(CA9

~ dtp&i

)
1975).

.f J

operation as

follows:

1

I

1

pproximately one mile south of the checkpoint is
a large black on yellow sign with flashing yellow
]
lights over the highway stating '*'All Vehicles, Stop
Ahead, 1 Mile.'\... Three-quarters of a mile further
north are two black on ye1low signs sr~ended over
the highway with flashing lights stating"'''Watch For
Brake Lights. 't,.J-A t the checkpoint, which is also the
location of a State of California weighing station, are
two large signs with flashing red lights suspended
over the higlnYay. These signs each state ~ 'Stop
Here-U.S. Officer~ ~ Placed on the highvmy are a
number of orange traffic cones funneling traffic into
two lanes where a Border Patrol agent in full dress
uniform, standing behind a white on red 1 'Stop'':'3ign
checks traffic. Blocking traffic in the unused lanes are
official U.S. Border Patrol vehicles with flashing red
lights. In addition, there is a permanent building
which houses the Border Patrol office and temporary detention facilities. There are also floodlights for
nighttime operation."- M=;_:s at: _
3G8 F.SU-ff7 aii/M-41/.
'

l

3A

The Border Patrol would prefer to keep this checkpoint
in operation ~01/lf.ww.ou.sf!d,
all tiffieoJlbut bad weather, heavy traffic, and

~a spaR at

personnel shortages close it down about one third of the
time.

When it is open, officers screen all northbound traffic.

If anything about a vehicle or its occupants leads an
officer to suspect that it may be carrying aliens, he will
stop the car and ask the occupants about their citizenship.
If the officer's suspicion persists, or if the questioning
enhances it, he will "inspect" the car for aliens, looking

4.
1
t ~

in places where an alien might hide.

0rU~.a"tUr1A.s at o~.JL. ~~ ~ s..~a/t)
A.t: othet: checkpoints, where traffic permits, the -a~ent cg_
'dl~.g,k
-h-aff;·e a+ SoW\ e. i ~ I ·~ €.A/o-OU _)1..- i{;ct- of~' CJLh5 c~

f-€u.

~

stop all vehicles for questioning and

EIWi:;f

:i:rl:sf3eet lfta'RYJ-

I·~s~ecf mo'('(' '1/C' ~de.s f'o~Lu.
~~· a ~' ~· ~igh-level Border Patrol
officials decide where to locate traffic checkpoints,
apparently in accord with established criteria that include
the degree of inconvenience to the public and the potential
for safe operation, as well as the likely success in
movement of

aliens. ~

--The Government maintains that these characteristics
justify dispensing with probable cause at ' - traffic checkpointsl despite the Court 1 s holding in Almeida-Sanchez.
'

gives essentially two reasons for

-

rr:~~::.B:l~i.U~~IiiWft·

It

First,

•

i

a

in deciding which cars

he will search is limited by the location of the checkpoint.
Before Almeida-Sanchez, roving patrols

were~all~

to stop and search any car within 100 miles of the border.
Second, the circumstances surrounding a checkpoint stop
and search are far less intrusive than the

circumstances~

1

5.
of a roving-patrol stop.

Roving patrols often operate at

night on seldom-traveled roads, and their approach may
frighten motorists.

At traffic checkpoints the motorist

can see that other vehicles are being stopped, he can see
visible signs of the officers' authority, and he is much
less likely to be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion.
These differences are relevant to the constitutional
issue, since the central concern of the Fourth Amendment
is to protect e itii!lC£'1.. liberty and privacy from arbitrary
and oppressive interference by government officials.
~

Camara v. Municipal Court, A87 U.S. 523, 528 (1967);
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).

The

Fourth Amendment's requirement that searches and seizures

po\;ce
be reasonable may also limitAuse .of unnecessarily
..:::n..~_........ 4tu~~-<.

~ I#
,I\
~~ ~

-,'£
frightening or offensive methods ofAinvestig.ating crime.
See,

~.g.,

.

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1968); Camara,

supra, at 531; Schmerber, supra, at 771.

The differences

between a roving patrol a:nd a checkpoint, however, are
primarily relevant to the reasonableness of the stop rather

6.

than the search.

Unlike motorists who are stopped for

questioning .)

~HHHI~iw ~HH&HHBRiHiw~ eftly ~

those who are subjected to a

search are unlikely to be reassured by seeing that the
Border Patrol searches other cars as well.

OVI~ ~

Where Afew are

singled out for a search, as at San Clemente, motorists may
find the searches especially offensive.
Moreover, we are not persuaded that the checkpoint
limits to any meaningful extent the
discretion to select cars for search.

g

a officer's
The record in the

consolidated proceeding indicates that only about 3%
of the cars that pass the San Clemente checkpoint are stopped
for either questioning or a search)

368 F.

Supp., at ~11

~
~ ~o checkpoint reported a search rate of more than 10 or 15%.

I4.

a[

J.//J J/J5,

~Throughout the system, fewer than 3% of the vehicles that
passed through checkpoints in 1974 were searched.
for the United States, at 29.

Brief

It is apparent from these

figures that checkpoint officers exercise a substantial
degree of discretion in deciding which cars to search.

The

Government maintains that they voluntarily exercise
that discretion with restraint and search only vehicles
that arouse their suspicion, and it insists the officers
should be free of judicial oversight of any kind.

Viewed

realistically, this position would authorize the Border

,

7.

Patrol to

Vil-kt'des

search ~at

random, for no officer

ever would

have to justify his decision to search a particular car.
'-'Tilis degree of J
~~ discretion to search private automobiles is not

Terry v. Ohio, supra, at 20-22, that the imperative of
L a law enforcementJ
the Fourth Amendment is that/ . . officer's reasons for

~~

citizen's privacy must be judged against
an objective standard.
• iaiJihniaana:knaaas

~

Tile Fourth Amendment

~~

·-eaftfto-t: tolerate
/\

upon
"intrusions
constitutionally guaranteed rights based on

"'A- 4..., 4~

nothing

ort

~Fie]

.

};{.,j.J..
,J--z..J .,
/

JJ

inarticulate hunches,

I L 21.

"If subjective good faith alone were the test,
/'7) the protections of the Fourth Amendment would
l--f - evaporate, and the people would be 'secure in

their persons, houses, papers, and effects,'
only in the discretion of the police." Beck v.
Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964).
,

--

-LV

-ao;f1··"' , ii~u
even of an automobile, ~~ substantial
5

A search,

2

invasion of

privacy~To

arbitrariness , the Court

protect that privacy from official
always has regarded probable

cause as the minimum requirement for a lawful search.
Almeida-Sanchez, supra, at 269-270; Chambers v. Maroney,
399
ide

u.s.

42, 51 (1968).

ha

rejected the

that probab
search

premises, even

-

8.

tfi

-

supra;
387

u.s.

goal. l

activ· ty is not

(1967).

the

s~e

principle must

I

frJVd~re.
;:e)\follow Almeida-Sanchez

./

apply to

and hold that . . . at traffic checkpoints - . . removed from
the border and its functional.- equivalents,

~

officers

may not search private vehicles without consent or probable

cause.~
The Government listed in its reply brief some of
the factors on which officers .._ have relied in deciding
which cars to search.

They include the number of persons in

a vehicle, the appearance and behavior of the driver and
passengers, their inability to speak English, the responses
they give to officers' questions, the nature of the
vehicle, and indications that it may be heavily loaded.
All of these factors . . properly • may be taken into
account in deciding whether there is probable cause to
search a particular vehicle.

In addition, as we note today

in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, ante, at ____ , the
officers are entitled to draw reasonable inferences from
these

facts in light of their knowledge of the area

/
and their prior experience with aliens and smugglers.
In this

m;a case, however, the officers advabced no

special reasons for believing respondent's vehicle
contained aliens.

. . the absence of probable cause

:=.

makes the search invalid.

The Government also contends that even if AlmeidaSanchez applies to checkpoint searches, the Court of
Appeals erred in voiding this

because it
occurred after

search ~

the date of decision in Almeida-Sanchez but before the
Court of Appeals in

United States v. Bowen,

500 F.2d 960 (CA9 1974), aff'd, post, at

--- ,

stated

that it would require probable cause for checkpoint searches.
Examination of the Government's brief in the Ninth Circuit

a

EZ&BB&B£2

below.

indicates that it did not raise this question

On the contrary, it represented to the court that

the decision in Bowen would be "determinative of the issues
in this case."

We therefore decline to consider this issue,

fup~~rt.~.

which was raised for the first time in ~ his

Ooad!! ~

Affirmed.

Ortiz

[

A.

I

FOOTNOTES

1.

Such places typically include the trunk, under the

hood, and beneath the chassis, and if the vehicle is a truck,
a camper, or the like, the
portion as well.

o~'ce12
Aageata-

inspects the enclosed

But an immigration inspection is not

always so confined.

In Almeida-Sanchez, the

off 'cell..

~ removed

the back seat cushion because there were reports

i-k-a t
~

aliens

~all ~~ev-found seated upright behind seats from which the

sQ~~

[

springs had been removed.

413 U.S., at 286 (dissenting

[

opinion).

]

~.

The substantiality of the invasion of privacy in an

automobile search may vary with the circumstances, as
there are significant differences between "an aut omobile
and a home or office".

Chambers v. Maroney, 299 U.S. 42,

48 (1969); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, supra, at

]

______ (Powell, J., concurring).

]

facts
and the i r prior experienc
3.

We have no occasion to decide whether a warrant

could issue approving checkpoint searches based on information about the area as a whole, in the absence of cause to
believe that a particular car is carrying concealed aliens,
because the
had not

o\h'evtS

~geat ~ had

~ieJ.

s.R ugn~

no such warrant for this search and

to obtain one.

See Almeida-Sanchez v.

United States, supra, at 275 (Mr. Justice Powell, concurring);
Camara v. Municipal Court, supra.

We also need not decide

whether checkpoints and roving patrols must be treated the
same for all

purposes, or whether Border Patrol

officers may lawfully stop motorists for questioning at an
established checkpoint without reason to believe that a
particular vehicle is carrying aliens.
v. Brignoni-Ponce, ante, at

Cf.

United States

Nor do we ••••

&g

suggest that probable cause would be required for all
rivate_j
inspections of motor vehicles.

) ,Pv~c~
It is quite possiblel\that
/

different considerations would apply to routine
inspections required as a condition of road use.

safety

pc/ss

5/16/75

No. 73-2050

UNITED STATES v. ORTIZ

MEMORANDUM OF MR. JUSTICE POWELL.
Border Patrol agents stopped respondent's car for a
routine immigration search at the traffic checkpoint on
Interstate Highway 5 at San Clemente, California, on
November 12, 1973.
the trunk.

They found three aliens concealed in

None of them was entitled to be in the United

States, and respondent was convicted on three counts of
knowingly transporting aliens who were in the country
illegally.

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

reversed the conviction in an unreported opinion, relying
on dictum in its opinion in United States v. Bowen, 500 F.2d
960 (CA9 1974), aff'd, ante, p.

-

, to the effect that

our decision in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S.
266 (1973), required probable cause for all vehicle searches
in the border area, whether conducted by roving patrols
or at traffic checkpoints.

u.s.

824 (1974).

We granted . certiorari.

419

2.
Nothing in this record suggests that the Border
Patrol agents had any special reason to suspect that
respondent's car was carrying concealed aliens.

Nor does

the Government contend that the San Clemente checkpoint is
a functional eauivalent of the border.
United States, at 16.

.. '

Brief for the

The primary question for decision

is whether vehicle searches at traffic

ohe.c~p01tn.t$i,

like

the roving-patrol search in Almeida-Sanchez, must be based
upon probable cause.

.·
I.

In Almeida-Sanchez we rejected the Government's
contention that the nation's strong interest in controlling
immigration and the practical difficulties of policing the
Mexican border combined to justify dispensing with both
warrant and probable cause for vehicle searches by roving
patrols near the border.

Traffic checkpoints differ from

roving patrol in several respects.
'

'

A consolidated proceeding on motions to suppress
in this and similar cases produced an extensive factual

.

'

3.

record on the operation of traffic checkpoints in Southern
California.

United States v. ~' 368 F. Supp. 398 (SD

Cal. 1973).

The district court described the San Clemente

checkpoint as follows:

'~pproximately

one mile sonth of the checkpoint is
a large black on yellow sign 'vith flashing yellow
lights over the highway stating "All Vehicles, Stop
Ahead, 1 Mile." Three-quarters of a mile further
north are two black on yellow signs suspended over
the highway with flashing lights stating "Watch For
Brake Lights." At the checkpoint, which is also the
location of a State of California weighing station, are
two large signs '"'ith flashing red lights suspended
over the high"·ay. These signs each state "Stop
Here-U.S. Officers". Placed on the highway are
number of orange traffic cones funneling traffic into
two lanes ·where a Border Patrol agent in full dress
uniform, standing behind a white on red "Stop" sign
checks traffic. Blocking traffic in the unused lanes are
official U.S. Border Patrol vehicles with flashing red
lights. In addition, there is a permanent building
which houses the Border Patrol office and temporary detention facilities. There are also floodlights f01'
nighttime operation." Id. at
•.

a

When the checkpoint is in operation, officers slow
all traffic.

If anything about a vehicle or its occupants

suggests that it may be carrying aliens, the officer will
stop the car and ask the occupants about their citizenship.
If the officer's suspicion persists, or if the questioning
enhances it, he will "inspect" the car for aliens, looking

4.
1

in places where an alien might hide.

M· a t _ .

At other checkpoints, where traffic permits, the agents
may stop all vehicles for questioni-ng and may inspect many
of them.

Id. at ____:_,

-·

High-level Border Patrol

officials decide where to locate traffic rcheekpoints,
apparently in accord with established criteria that include
the degree of inconvenience to

~he

public and the potential
·'

for safe operation, as well as the likely success in
detecting and deterring the inland movement of aliens who
a:re-•in· the country illegally.

M·, at _ .

The Government maintains that these characteristics
justify dispensing with probable cause at a traffic checkpoint despite the Court's holding in Almeida-Sanchez.
gives essentially two reasons for the distinction.

It

First,

a checkpoint agent's discretion in deciding which cars
he will search is limited by the location of the checkpoint.
Before Almeida-Sanchez, roving patrols were free theoretically

••
to stop and search any ear within 100 miles of the border.
Second, the circumstances surrounding a checkpoint stop

.....

and search are far less intrusive than the circumstances.
.'

. •'

5.
of a roving-patrol stop.

Roving patrols often operate at

night on seldom-traveled roads, and their approach may
frighte·n motorists.

At traffic checkpoints the motorist

can see that other vehicles are being stopped, he can see
visible signs of the officers' authority, and he is much
less likely to be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion.
These differences are relevant to the constitutional
issue, since the central concern of the Fourth Amendment
is to protect citizenJ liberty and privacy from arbitrary
and oppressive interference by government officials.
Camara v. Municipal Court, 287 U.S. 523, 528 (1967);
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).
Fourth Amendment's requirement that searches and

The

s~izures

be reasonable may also limit use of unnecessarily
frightening or offensive methods . of investigating crime.
See,~·&·,

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1968); Camara,

supra, at 531; Schmerber, supra, at 771.

The differences

between a roving ?atrol and a checkpoint, however, are
pttimarily relevant to the reasonableness of the stop rather

·;.

6.

than the search.

Although a motorist who is stopped for

questioning may be soothed by seeing that the Border Patrol
requires the same information from everyone else, the
invasion of privacy caused by a search is the same whether
one car or a hundred are searched.

Moreover, we are not

persuaded that the checkpoint circumscribes to any meaningful•
extent the agent's discretion to select cars for search.
The record in the consolidated proceeding indicates that no
more than 3% of the cars that pass the San Clemente checkpoint are searched.

368 F. Supp., at ___ •

reported a search rate of over 10 or 15%.

No checkpoint

-Id.,

at

-

.

It is obvious that the agents retain a substantial degree
of discretion in deciding which cars to search.

The

Government maintains that they exercise that discretion
reasonably and search only vehicles that arouse their
2

suspicion, but it insists they should be free of judicial
oversight of any kind.

Viewed

~ealistically,

this position

would give the Border Patrol license to search any car
at all, for no agent ever would have to justify his decision
to search a particular car.

Such broad discretion to

'·

7.
I

sdarch private automobiles is inconsistent with the Fourth
I

A~endment,

as applied in Almeida-Sanchez. 413 U.S., at 272-

'

274; see Terry v. Qh!2, supra at 21-22.

We therefore adhere

tp Almeida-Sanchez and hold that at traffic

dhe~kpdints

I

~emoved

from the border and its functional equivale·n ts,

agents may not search private vehicles without consent or

f

probable cause.

3

II

The Government next contends that even if AlmeidaSanchez apples toccheckpoint searches, the Court of Appeals
erred in voiding this search, which occurred after the
date of decision in Almeida-Sanchez but before the Court
of Appeals indicated in United States v. Bowen, 500 F.2d

___

960 (CA9 1974), aff 1 d, post, at ____ , that it would require
_..,_...,_,

\, probable cause

fo~ _che~~oint__ •:ar,e hes )\ The

basis for \

',

\ this argument is the Government ' s contention that United\
.~

I
\

'

\
I

: States v. Bowen established "new law" in the Ninth Circui t

'

t~e exclusionary rule would not \
'

t nd that the purpose'!-ro(
~e
I

served by applying that decision retroacttvely.

hJe ~ ~-Aft'"/Yto

+k

lo

f)'.J.AP:

C,.1}..-vtA', d.t.Jt ,.FJ.t...-<': a . ,(,,t,•'J..(.

t)._ t~t! l&to.. ·

8.
This analysis fails for two reasons.

First, the

Court of Appeals' opinion in Bowen announced ·no "new law".
It simply extended the Almeida-Sanchez decision on roving
patrols to the closely analogous facts of checkpoint searches.
Second, the Government cannot claim that it had no notice
that the legality of checkpoint searches was under a cloud.
In Almeida-Sanchez the four dissenti-ng ,J'ustices indicated
that they thought the legality of ·checkpoint searches was
unquestioned.

413 U.S., at 288.

The reasoning of the

majority opinion, however, applied equally to checkpoint
searches, and the special concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
Powell expressed no view on the question.

Id., at 276.

The Government admits that the Department of Justice
studied these opinio·n s and concluded that they did not
squarely disapprove existing precedent in the courts of
appeals approving checkpoint searches.

The Border Patrol

decided to c:o·ntinue relying on that precedent until it
was
risk

I

expr~ssly

I

~hat

overruled.

In short, it took a calculated

the courts of appeal• would not be persuaded

9.

that Almeida-Sanchez required them to overrule their
,l
~

decisions on checkpoint searches, and that a m,t]ority of
•'

l/'

this Court would hold, when faced with the/ question, that
I
/
checkpoint searches did not require probable cause.
~

l

/

.l

The Court has refused in the past to give retroactive
/
/
application to cases overruling its own past decisions even
;/
.r
~

when those decisions had long been questioned, concluding
that in the absence of governing precedent in lower courts,
officials may rely on this Court's decisions until we
abandon them.

Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 248-

251 (1969).

But when the only precedent approving the

Government's

pr~ptices

is in lower courts, and a decision

of this Court raises serious question about their validity,
we cannot conclude that a court of appeals errs when it
gives retrospective application to a decision overruli·ng
its cl~uded cases.

I

I

I
I

Affirmed.

·.,

Ortiz

A.
FOOTNOTES
1.

Such places typically include the trunk, under the

hood, and beneath the chassis, and if the vehicle is a truck,
..·

a camper, or the like, the agent inspects the enclosed
portion as well.

But an immigration inspection is not

always so confined.

In Almeida-Sanchez, the agent removed

the back seat cushion because there were reports of aliens
'·

being found seated upright behind seats from which the
springs had been removed.

413 U.S., at 286 (dissenting

..

opinion).
2.

'.

The Government listed in its reply brief some of

the factors on which agents commonly rely in deciding
which cars to stop.

They include the number of persons

in a vehicle, the appearance and behavior of the driver
and passe·n gers, their inability to speak English, the
responses they give to agents' questions, the natur e
of the vehicle, and indications that it may be heavily
loaded.

All of these factors properly may be taken into

account in deciding whether there is probable cause to
search a particular vehicle.

1

'.,

\

\

In addition, as we note

today in United States v . Brignoni-Ponce,

~'

at ____ ,
...

,.

..•
'

B.
the officers are entitled to draw reasonable inferences
from these facts in light of their knowledge of the area
and their prior experiences with aliens and smugglers.
3.

We have no occasion to decide whether a warrant

could issue approving checkpoint searches based on information about the area as a whole, in the absence of cause to
believe that a particular car is carrying concealed aliens,
because the agents had no such warrant for this search and
had not sought to obtain one.

See Almeida-Sanchez v.

United States, supra, at 275 (Mr. Justice Powell, concurring);
Camara v. MUnicipal Court, supra.

II
\

8.
This analysis fails for two reasons.

First, the

Court of Appeals' opinion in Bowen announced no "new law".
It simply extended the Almeida-Sanchez decision on roving
patrols to the closely analogous facts of checkpoint searches.
Second, the Government cannot claim that it had no notice
that the legality of checkpoint searches was under a cloud.
In Almeida-Sanchez the four dissenting Justices indicated
that they thought the legality of checkpoint searches was
unquestioned.

413 U.S., at 288.

The reasoning of the

majority opinion, however, applied equally to checkpoint
searches, and the special concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
Powell expressed no view on the question.

Id., at 276.

The Government admits that the Department of Justice
studied these opinions and concluded that they did not

Iowe. I'"

C.OCJ-

v"t

squarely disapprove existing" precedent =i-n- ~he
a,~ea ~ approving

checkpoint searches.

eew~tts

ef )-

The Border Patrol

decided to continue relying on that precedent until it
was expressly overruled.

In short, it took a calculated

risk that the courts of appeals would not be persuaded

9.
that Almeida-Sanchez required them to overrule their
decisions on checkpoint searches, and that a majority of
this Court would hold, when faced with the question, that
checkpoint searches did not require probable cause.

lk.\s
~

Court has refused in the past to give retroactive

application to cases overruling its own past decisions even
when those decisions had long been questioned, concluding

officials may rely on this Court's decisions until we
abandon them.
251 (1969).

Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 248But when the only precedent approving the

Government's practices is in lower courts, and a decision
of this Court raises serious question about their validity,
we cannot conclude that a court of appeals errs when it
gives retrospective application to a decision overruling
its clouded cases.

Affirmed.
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Memorandum of MR. JusTICE PowELL.
Border Patrol officers stopped respondenes car for a
routine immigration search at the traffic checkpoint on
Interstate Highway 5 at San Clemente, California, on
November 12, 1973. They found three aliens concealed
in the trunk, and respondent was convicted on three
counts of knowingly transporting aliens who were in the
country illegally. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed the conviction in an unreported opinion,
relying on dictum in its opinion in United States v. _
Bowen, 500 F. 2d 960 (CA9 1974) , aff'd, ~ p. - ,
to the effect that our decision in Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States, 413 U. S. 266 (1973), required probable
cause for all vehicle searches in the border area, whether
conducted by roving patrols or at traffic checkpoints.
We granted certiorari. 419 U. S. 824 (1974).
Nothing in this record suggests that the Border Patrol
officers had any special reason to suspect that respondent's car was carrying concealed aliens. Nor does the
Government contend that the San Clemente checkpoint
is a functional equivalent of the border. Brief for the
United States, at 16. The only question for decision is
whether vehicle searches at traffic checkpoints, like the
roving-patrol search in Almeida-Sanchez, must be based
on probable cause.
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In Almeida-Sanchez we rejected the Government's contention that the Nation's strong interest in controlling
immigration and the practical difficulties of policing the
Mexican border combined to justify dispensing with both
warrant and probable cause for vehicle searches by roving
patrols near the border. The facts did not require us to
decide whether the same rule would apply to traffic checkpoints, which differ from roving patrols in several important respects. 413 U. S., at 273; id., at 276 (MR. JusTICE·
PowELL, concurring).
A consolidated proceeding on motions to suppress ih
tliis and similar cases produced an extensive factual'
record on the operation of traffic checkpoints in Southern
California. United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398 (SD
Cal. 1973). The San Clemente checkpoint is 62"air miles
and 66 road miles north of the Mexican border. It is
on the principal highway between San Diego and Los
Angeles, and over 10 million vehicles pass the checkpoint
1n a year. United States v. Martinez-F'uerte, F. 2d
-, (CA9 1975). The District Court in Baca
d·escribed the checkpoint's operation as follows:
"Approximately one mile south of the checkpoint
is a large black on yellow sign with flashing yellow
lights over the highway stating 'All Vehicles, Stop
Ahead, 1 Mile.' Three-quarters of a mile further
north are two black on yellow signs suspended over
the highway with flashing lights stating 'Watch for
Brake Lights.' At the checkpoint, which is also the
Iocation of a State of California weighing station,
are two large signs with flashing red lights suspended -<L
over the highway. These signs;eacJlstate 'Stop
Here-D. S. Officers.' Placed on the highway are
a number of orange traffic cones funneling traffic into
two lanes where a Border Patrol agent in full dress
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uniform, standing behind a white on red 'Stop' sign
checks traffic. Blocking traffic in the unused lanes
~official U. S. B~der Patrol vehicles with flashing red lights. In addition, there is a permanent
building which houses the Border Patrol office and
temporary detention facilities. There are also floodlights for nighttime operation." 368 F. Supp., at
410-411.

The Border Patrol would prefer to keep this checkpoint in operation continuously, but bad weather, heavy
traffic, and personnel shortages close it down about onethird of the time. When it is open, officers screen all
northbound traffic. If anything about a vehicle or its
occupants leads an officer to suspect that it may be carrying aliens, he will stop the car and ask the occupants
about their citizenship. If the officer's suspicion persists,
or if the questioning enhances it, he will "inspect" the
car for aliens, looking in places where an alien might
hide. 1 Operations at other checkpoints are similar,
although the traffic at some is light enough that officers
can stop all vehicles for questioning and inspect more
vehicles routinely. High-level Border Patrol officials
decide where to locate traffic checkpoints, apparently in
accord with established criteria that include the degree
of inconvenience to the public and the potential for safe
operation, as well as the likely success in detecting and
deterring the illegal movement of aliens.
1 Such places typically include the trunk, under the hood, and
beneath the chassis, and if the vehicle is a truck, a camper, or the
like, the officer inspects the enclosed portion as well. But an immigration inspection is not always so confined. In Almeida-Sa:nchez,
the officer removed the back seat cushion because there were reports
that aliens had been found seated upright behind seats from which
the springs had been removed. 413 U. S., at 286 (dissenting
opinion).
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The Government maintains that these characteristics
justify dispensing with probable cause at traffic checkpoints despite the Court's holding in Almeida-Sanchez.
It gives essentially two reasons for distinguishing that
case. First, a checkpoint officer's discretion in deciding
which cars he will search is limited by the location of
the checkpoint. Before Almeida-Sanchez, roving patrols
were theoretically free to stop and search any car within
100 miles of the border. Second, the circumstances surrounding a checkpoint stop and search are far less intrusive than the circumstances of a roving-patrol stop.
Roving patrols often operate at night on seldom-traveled
roads, and their approach may frighten motorists. At
traffic checkpoints the motorist can see that other vehicles are being stopped, he can see visible signs of the
bfficers' authority, and he is much less likely to be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion.
These differences are relevant to the constitutional
1ssue, since the central concern of the Fourth Amendment
l.s to protect liberty and privacy from arbitrary and
oppressive interference by government officials. Camam
v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 528 (1967); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966). The Fourth
Amendment's requirement that searches and seizures be
reasonable may also limit police use of unnecessarily
frightening or offensive methods of surveillance and
investigation. See, e. g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1,
-16-17 (1968); Camara, supra, at 531; Schmerber, supra,
at 771. The differences between a roving patrol and a
checkpoint, however, are primarily relevant to the rea'sonableness of the stop rather than the search. Unlike
motorists who are stopped for questioning, those who are
'subjected to a search are unlikely to be reassured by
seeing that the Border Patrol searches other cars as well.
Where only a few are singled out for a search, as at San
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Clemente, motorist~ may find the searches especially
offensive.
Moreover, we are not persuaded that the checkpoint
limits to any meaningful extent the officer's discretion to
select cars for search. The record in the consolidated
proceeding indicates that only about 3ro of the cars that
pass the San Clemente checkpoint are stopped for either
questioning or a search, 368 F. Supp., at 411, and no
checkpoint reported a search rate of more than 10ro or
15%. Id., at 412-415. Throughout the system, fewer
than 3% of the vehicles that passed through checkpoints
in 1974 were searched. Brief for the United States, at
'· 29. It is apparent from these figures that checkpoint
officers exercise a substantial degree of discretion in de, ciding which cars to search. The Government main, tains that they voluntarily exercise that discretion with
t:estraint and search only vehicles that arouse their
suspicion, and it insists the officers should be free of
judicial oversight of any kind. Viewed realistically, this
position would authorize the Border Patrol to search
vehicles at random, for no officer ever would have to
justify his decision to search a particular car.
This degree of discretion to search private automobiles
is not consistent with the Fourth Amendment. We
stressed in Terry v. Ohio, supra, at 20-22, that the im. perative of the Fourth Amendment is that a law en' forcement officer's reasons for breaching a citizen's protected privacy must be judged against an objective
· standard. The Fourth Amendment does not tolerate
"instrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights
based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate
hunches," id., at 21, or the officer's subjective good faith.
"If subjective good faith alone were the test, the
protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the people would be 'secure in their per-
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sons, houses, papers, and effects,' only in the discretion of the police." Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 97
(1964).
A search, even of an automobile, is a substantial invasion of privacy. 2 To protect that privacy from officiai
arbitrariness, the Court always has regarded probable
cause as the minimum requirement for a lawful search,.
Almeida-Sanchez, supra, at 269-270; Chambers v. Ma-·
roney, 399 U. S. 42, 51 (1968). We therefore follow
Almeida-Sanchez and hold that at traffic checkpoints removed from the border and its functional equivalents,
officers may not search private vehicles without consent
or probable cause. 3
The Government listed in its reply brief some of the
factors on which officers have relied in deciding which
cars to search. They include the number of persons in
a vehicle, the appearance and behavior of the driver
2 The substantiality of the invasion of privacy in an automobile
search may vary with the circumstances, as there are significant
differences between "an automobile and a home or office." Chambers
v. Maroney, 299 U. S. 42, 48 (1969); Almeida-Swnchez v. United
(PowELL, J., concurring).
States, supra, at 3 We have no occasion to decide whether a warrant could issue
approving checkpoint searches based on information about the area
as a whole, in the absence of cause to believe that a particular car
is carrying concealed aliens, because the officers had no such warrant
for this search and had not tried to obtain one. See AlmeidaSanchez v. United States, supra, at 275 (MR. JusTICE PowELL, con·
curring); Camara v. Municipal Court, supra. We also need not
decide whether checkpoints and roving patrols must be treated the
same for all purposes, or whether Border Patrol officers may lawfully stop motorists for questioning at an established checkpoint
without reason to believe that a particular vehicle is carrying aliens.
Cf. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, ante, at - . Nor do we suggest that probable cause would be required for all inspections of
private motor vehicles. It is quite possible, for example, that different considerations would apply to routiJ:le safety inspections
required as a condition of road use.
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and passengers, their inability to speak English, the
responses they give to officers' questions, the nature
of the vehicle, and indications that it may be heavily
loaded. All of these factors properly may be taken into
account in deciding whether there is probable cause to
search a particular vehicle. In addition, as we note
today in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, ante, at - ,
the officers are entitled to draw reasonable inferences
from these facts in light of their knowledge of the area
·and their prior experience with aliens and smugglers.
In this case, however, the officers advanced no special
reasons for believing respondent's vehicle contained
aliens. The absence of probable cause makes the search
'invalid.
II
The Government also contends that even if AlmeidaSanchez applies to checkpoint searches, the Court of
Appeals erred in voiding this search because it occurred
after the date of decision in Almeida-Sanchez but before
the Court of Appeals in United States v. Bowen,~ i.ftt:J'f'a)
2d 968 (OA~ lW-4-), aff'd;-1t08t, a;t~ stated that it
would require probable cause for checkpoint searches.
Examination of the Government's brief in the Ninth
Circuit indicates that it did not raise this question below.
On the contrary, it represented to the court that the decision in Bowen would be "determinative of the issues
in this case." We therefore decline to consider this
issue, which was raised for the first time in the petition
for certiorari.
Affirmed.

